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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the nature of public evaluations of the presidents of South Africa over 
time. It consists of two statistically explorative components; a descriptive analysis which 
looks at the nature of Presidential Approval, and a multivariate analysis which tests 
competing hypothesis. Using IDASA and Afrobarometer data from 1997, 2000, 2002, 2004, 
2006, 2008, 2011 and 2015, this thesis tests an Identity hypothesis, a Performance Evaluation 
hypothesis and a Cognitive Awareness hypothesis to determine which factors predict 
approval levels of the president. Findings indicate that South Africans are more likely to 
make use of low-information reasoning when ascribing support than to use their cognitive 
awareness of current affairs. There is an indication that South Africans who share an identity 
with the president are more likely to approve of the president- especially in recent years. 
However, South Africans are rational people who are more likely to base their approval of the 
president on how the government performs and how they perceive the economy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2014 the African National Congress (ANC) won their fifth successive term as South 
Africa’s ruling party, which meant that their party leader, Jacob Zuma, became South 
Africa’s sixth democratic president. Yet, prior to his election in 2009, the South African news 
media was rife with criticism of Zuma over rape charges laid against him, his views of 
women, his polygamous beliefs, and his involvement in the South African arms deal saga 
(Feinstein, 2007: 216-225). Despite these allegations not only did the ANC garner high levels 
of voting support in 2009 and 2014 with Zuma as its leader, but Zuma has been seen as a 
highly popular leader- often referred to as “the populist” by academics and media alike 
(BBC, n.d. and Pascal Zachary, 2009).  
By 2013, when former South African President Nelson Mandela passed away, it seemed as 
though South Africans had changed their minds about President Zuma. He was met with 
widespread boos across a packed First National Bank (FNB) stadium in Johannesburg 
whenever he made an appearance on the stadium’s big screen. Former South African 
President Thabo Mbeki, on the other hand, received a high level of applause and cheering, 
despite having been seen as widely unpopular prior to and shortly after being asked to resign 
ahead of the end of his second presidential term in 2008.  
This manifestation of a change in attitudes towards these two presidents raises interesting 
questions about the South African people and their political attitudes. On what basis do South 
Africans decide whether they approve or disapprove of their president? What role do external 
influences have on South Africans, for example, the role of news media (which at times may 
seem the most critical of Jacob Zuma)? Do they internalise or ignore what they hear or read, 
or do they focus on other factors, such as the performance of the president’s government and 
their ability to deliver macro- and micro-economic goods and services? Finally, do they 
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consider personal characteristics and traits such as race, gender, or ethnicity of themselves 
and their leader?  
Alternative explanations/theories argue that even if people are not fully informed or 
sophisticated (or educated), they base their evaluations on low level reasoning. To which 
extent does “sophistication” play a role in the shaping of South Africans’ evaluations of the 
president? Additionally, how have any of these factors changed over time? Do people use the 
same criteria or do they change them depending on the incumbent i.e. have evaluations of 
former Presidents Thabo Mbeki, and Nelson Mandela been shaped differently to that of Jacob 
Zuma?  
The South African Context – Shaping the South African Mind 
South Africa has a pluralistic and heterogeneous society. This means that South Africa has a 
range of social cleavages that, literature has told us, ought to take precedence in public 
opinion research. These social cleavages are born out of the separatist nature of pre-colonial, 
colonial and Apartheid South Africa.  
Daryl Glaser (2000) has argued that South African racial and ethnical order has been defined 
by a number of historical factors. Whilst the existence of racism was already entrenched in 
European society before landing on South African shores, there were a specific set of 
occurrences that allowed racial and ethnical cleavages to become firmly entrenched in South 
Africa. Upon settling in South Africa, European settlers were met with their first problem 
when trying to establish a land-extensive economy- the lack of labourers. This problem was 
solved by bringing in non-European slaves and using indigenous Khoisan. These labour 
relations formed the basis of the initial race-based hierarchy. Glaser also argued that the 
racial attitudes formed amongst the Dutch-Afrikaners through their isolation from other 
societal groups, the continuing existence of the Griqua people and their lasting identity, the 
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forced instillation of Christianity (and the accompanying idea of “normality”), as well as the 
role of British capitalism in dispossessing blacks, all had a unique contribution towards 
establishing a racial and ethnical hierarchy in South Africa (Glaser, 2000: 6-20).  
This racial hierarchy became further entrenched with the introduction of Apartheid. The 
Apartheid era can be defined as a period of “racial segregation, separate development of the 
different groups, preservation of white Afrikaner identity, white political domination, 
exploitation of cheap black labour, or the maintenance of the capitalist system” (Roberts, 
1994:54).  Some Apartheid laws made a deeper impact than others and formed the basis for 
the development of more complex laws and a more complex society. 
The basis of all Apartheid laws lay in the Population Registration Act 1950 which stated that 
South Africans were to be assigned to racial groups (black, white, indian, or coloured) based 
upon physical and linguistic characteristics (Seekings, 2008: 3 and Roberts, 1994: 54). These 
racial groups determined what people could do, where they did it and with whom. Even 
though the Population Registration Act did not state that one race group was better or more 
privileged than another, it formed the basis of other racially discriminatory legislation.  
Despite forming the largest proportion of the country, black South Africans were harshly 
discriminated against in every way. The most obvious (and oldest) form of discrimination 
took place in the labour market. Major sectors such as mining and agriculture saw the 
introduction of migrant labour systems and the “colour bar”, notions which influenced other 
sectors of the South African labour market. Essentially, this meant that non-white South 
Africans rarely made more than white South Africans, and the possibility of upward mobility 
was severely stunted (Glaser, 2000: 42 – 48, and Johnstone, 1970: 125-135). The difference 
in wages earned amongst different racial groups had obvious consequences in terms of what 
different groups could afford such as material possession and general livelihood.  
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The living conditions of different population groups varied substantially. The Group Areas 
Act 1950 enforced the relocation of groups to areas that were outlined by government as 
appropriate to that group. It meant that areas close to urban centres were marked as “white” 
territories, whereas areas along the periphery and rural areas were marked as liveable places 
for Indians, Coloureds and Black. The living conditions in areas marked for white South 
Africans were considerably better than other areas. A lack of infrastructure and government 
input in non-white areas meant that these areas were severely under-developed (Nelson 
Mandela Centre for Memory, n.d.)  
Legislation also impacted the type of education received by various race groups. The Bantu 
Education Act 1953 was passed under the recommendation of the Commission of Native 
Education. In terms of institutional structures, what this meant was that control of black 
schools and syllabi was centralised in Pretoria. In 1963 and 1965, the Coloured Persons 
Education and Indian Education Acts were respectively passed. These Acts transferred the 
control of Coloured education to the Department of Coloured Affairs and Indian education to 
the Department of Indian Affairs (Molteno, 1984: 88-94). The aim of the syllabi for Black, 
Indian and Coloured education was to ensure that people within these race groups were 
educated in the direction and to the level that suited the ruling government. As Frank Molteno 
states;  
“[t]hey aimed to dwarf the minds of black children by conditioning them to servitude. 
Like the segregation and inferior schooling before it, the new system was intended to 
prepare black children for the subordinated positions that awaited them in such a way 
that they were appropriately equipped with limited skills as well as ready to resign 
themselves to exploitation.” (Molteno, 1984: 94) 
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What this indicates is that the ruling National Party aimed to educate black South Africans 
enough to run homelands, but not enough to threaten the job security of white working class 
South Africans (Molteno, 1984:94). Levels of education amongst these groups remained 
either limited or low. Non-white South Africans were able to receive an education that reared 
them towards unskilled or semi-skilled labour. Employment prospects were often severely 
limited to lower wage paying jobs.  
The impact left by the Population Registration Act, Group Areas Act, Bantu Education Act, 
as well as other laws not mentioned above, ensured that today South Africans have different 
perceptions based upon their individual histories. Apartheid firmly entrenched racial 
cleavages, ethnical cleavages, regional cleavages, and class cleavages. Economically, South 
Africa has one of the most unequal societies in the world- evident by the high Gini-
coefficient of 65 out of 100, according to the latest World Bank data1. What this means is that 
there is a small minority of rich South Africans and a large proportion of the society that is 
poverty ridden. Whilst during the Apartheid era race and economic inequality were strictly 
correlated, current South African economic inequality and race are strongly, but not perfectly, 
correlated. According to Natrass and Seekings (2001), in 1993 the richest decile in South 
Africa earned half the total household income, whilst the bottom four deciles earned less than 
10% of total household income. Also, 90% of the poorest 60% of households were black, 
whilst 75% of the richest decile were white (Natrass and Seekings, 2001: 46-49). What this 
indicates is that the majority of South African people exited Apartheid being extremely poor, 
and in need better economic and living conditions. 
Socially, there were obvious marks left by Apartheid. Whilst it was easier to remove the 
formal institutions of Apartheid, it is harder to remove the attitudes shaped by Apartheid. The 
racial hierarchy is still entrenched in the minds of many South Africans. According to the 
                                                          
1 Data available at http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.9 
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South African Human Rights Commission there have been over 500 reported cases of racist 
incidences in South Africa in the year proceeding July 2014 (News24, 2014). These do not 
include unreported cases. Many South Africans continue to live racially and culturally 
separate and homogenous lifestyles as a result of the lack of regional migration and perhaps 
even as a result of cultural preservation.  
Since the end of Apartheid, we saw an interesting manifestation of political attitudes in South 
Africa. The ANC became the leading political party, gaining a majority vote in every election 
since the first democratic election in 1994 (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009: 25-27). Following its 
formation in the early 20th century, the ANC as an organisation became a leader in the fight 
against Apartheid and the fight for equal rights for black South Africans. They led some of 
the most prominent passive and active resistance campaigns from its inception in 1912 to the 
fall of Apartheid. Some of their most noteworthy efforts include the Defiance Campaign, 
which called for mass non-violent civil disobedience, and the establishment of Umkhonto we 
Sizwe, the military arm of the ANC which carried out acts of sabotage. Following the fall of 
Apartheid, the ANC became a key player in negotiations for a new South Africa. In the first 
free national election of 1994, it stood as one of the parties running for governing power, and 
won with an overwhelming 62.6% majority (African National Congress, n.d.). Given the role 
the ANC played in the liberation of black South Africans, it is no surprise that many black 
South Africans have a deep-rooted loyalty to the party. 
It is for this reason that research following the 1994 election delved into the racial cleavages 
that exist in voting behaviour. Many have found that race has been a strong predictor of 
voting behaviour, especially for black and white South Africans. Though they did not prove 
that black and white South Africans exclusively voted for specific parties, they prove that 
there was a higher likelihood that people of a specific race would vote for specific parties 
(Ferree, 2006:803).  
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Voting behaviour studies touch on the complicated and entangled nature of South African 
political attitudes. For one thing, each political party had its own racial or even ethnic support 
base- such as parties like the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) which was established by Zulu 
Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his fellow patriots (Inkatha Freedom Party, n.d.). By the 
end of Apartheid the racial hierarchy had been well entrenched in the minds and everyday 
lifestyle of South Africans. These divisions were further entrenched in the physical 
boundaries that separated people during Apartheid, and continued to separate people in the 
new South Africa owing to restricted relocation into spaces typically occupied by members of 
a different race.  
What is obvious is that the past has affected the way South Africans live their lives. However, 
since becoming democratic, does it also influence the way South Africans make decisions?  
Are South Africans still bound under the mentality crafted under the colonial and Apartheid 
regimes, or do they think more critically and rationally when expressing their opinions? Can 
the same be said for the way South Africans approve or disapprove of the president? Do 
people who approve of the president fall within a specific category, or is approval of the 
president an arbitrary decision made by individuals? 
Research Question 
Given what we know about South Africans, do things such as race, ethnicity, where they 
come from or which party they support play a role in how they evaluate the president? Or are 
they able to hold leaders or government accountable for their actions. This leads me to ask 
the following research question: 
On what factors do South Africans base their evaluations of the performance of the 
president?  
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This may be further divided into sub-questions such as do South Africans hold their leaders 
accountable for government performance? Or are evaluations still shaped by factors derived 
from South African history? What is the best explanation of presidential approval? Why do 
some South Africans approve of presidential performance while others are more critical? 
More importantly, what would answering these questions tell us about South Africans? What 
does this mean for South African society and research in general? Given what we know about 
South African society and African political science literature, we might assume that South 
Africans are more likely to use some part of their identity to ascribe support for the president. 
If this is the case, it means that I will confirm existing political science theories grounded in 
identity politics. It would mean that South African minds are still influenced by the ghost of 
Apartheid. It would mean that despite government and civil society’s efforts since 1994 to 
ensure that South Africa became the open and inclusive rainbow nation, South Africans are 
still a divided people in terms of their thinking and rationale.  
If I find, instead, that South Africans look around them and consider whether things are going 
well- thereby giving the president a score based upon how well he or his government are 
doing- it tells us that contrary to popular understanding, South Africans make rational based 
choices. This would mean that South African society has moved away from being considered 
as a traditional society and is more modern.  
I may also find that South Africans simply look at the man and make a decision. Since 1994, 
South Africa has had three elected presidents. Each president has differed in perceived 
character, and performance. At the broader level, Nelson Mandela was seen as “the father of 
the nation”, Thabo Mbeki as the “intellectual”, and Jacob Zuma as the “populist” (Battersby, 
1999, Ciulla, 2004: 120, Adebajo, 2010: 179-180 and Robins, 2008: 416). Perhaps people 
based their evaluations upon who the president was, giving constant levels of approval 
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because they were who they were. This would raise important questions (and answers) about 
the South African people and what it takes to please them, as a leader. Perhaps, it may even 
provide future leaders with an idea of who their target audience is.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Presidential and Prime Ministerial popularity has been thoroughly covered in western 
literature. The variation and complexity of this study has been evident since it rose to 
prominence in the 1970s. What I aim to do in my literature review is to unpack the history of 
this topic so that it may inform the direction of my study. I will also address the ideas and 
themes present in public opinion literature specific to South Africa. In so doing, I will be able 
to specify particular gaps in the literature that are specific to the South African context. In 
having this two-fold review approach, I will be able to not only assess which relevant issues 
have been addressed and where the gap in the literature lies, but we may also have an 
indication of which variables are important for the purpose of this study. 
Presidential Popularity 
The study of presidential popularity has been well documented in the United States. The 
majority of literature makes use of the Gallup Poll to do descriptive, macro-level analyses of 
presidential popularity. The use of the Gallup Poll has been disputed amongst academics for 
its ability (or lack thereof) to predict voting behaviour. Lee Sigelman states that one may use 
the Gallup Polls if the survey was conducted at a time that was close to the elections 
(Sigelman, 1979: 532-533). Nonetheless, whilst the voting predictability of the Gallup Poll 
may be questioned, it is an accurate portrayal of presidential popularity levels in the United 
States at the point of survey.  
A large body of the literature is dedicated to discussing the cyclical model of presidential 
approval. Although there are a variety of variables considered to play a role in proving this 
hypothesis, the basic consensus is that all presidents experience their highest levels of 
approval following their election into office (referred to as the “Honeymoon period”), 
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followed by decreases in approval until the latter half of their term, where it would have 
reached its lowest point. Thereafter, approval rises slightly until the end of their term. At the 
most basic level, it has been argued that presidential popularity is a function of time and the 
president is a “passive observer of his down-sliding popularity” (Mueller, 1970: 25 and 
Stimson, 1976:1, 5-6, 9-10). However, various authors have argued that it cannot simply be 
time that influences presidential popularity, but rather what happens during that time. 
There are two arguments which have dominated presidential popularity literature in trying to 
prove why the cyclical model exists. The first argument is that presidential popularity is a 
function of events which occur during each presidency. Mueller (1973) discusses four 
variables in detail, namely; “The Coalition-of-minorities” variable, where he proposes that if 
the president alienates enough minorities, he may develop an opposition big enough to lead to 
his defeat; “The Rally-round-the-flag” variable, which looks at the phenomena of events 
which lead to an increase in patriotism and subsequently, an increase in levels of presidential 
approval; “The Economic Slump” variable, where he uses the unemployment rate as an 
indicator for economic conditions, stating that increases in unemployment lead to decreases 
in approval, but not vice-versa; and “The War” variable, which indicates that as wars 
progress, levels of approval decrease. In his study he conducts a multiple regression analysis 
to ascertain if any variable is a significant predictor of presidential approval (Mueller, 1973: 
196-217). The conclusion is that as the presidency progresses, opinions surrounding these 
events are influencing the levels of approval the president receives, and this manifests in 
increasing and fluctuating levels of approval. 
The second argument is that presidential popularity is a function of expectation and 
disillusionment. This perception is grounded in the argument that all presidents have high 
levels of approval which can be attributed to the misperceptions of the public- as a result of 
ill-informed high expectation- and not the president. These “unrealistic early expectations 
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ensure the inevitability of later disillusionment” leading to a body of literature branded as 
Expectation/Disillusionment Theories (Stimson, 1976:1, 5-6, 9-10). It is also argued that 
levels of “sophistication” – or rather levels of education- act as another independent variable 
which may influence expectation and disillusionment. More importantly, when sophistication 
was introduced as a variable, authors found that lower levels of sophistication led to a 
substantial decrease in approval (Presser and Converse, 1976-77: 538-539).  
As expected, the literature did not go uncontested. Sigelman and Knight argued that the 
macro-level analysis of expectation/disillusionment using the Gallup poll was not an accurate 
representation of actual expectation and disillusionment. They claim that the only effective 
way to measure the Expectation/Disillusionment theory is to seek what expectations the 
public had- which cannot be efficiently done with cross-national surveys. They proceed to 
use the CBS News/New York Times Polls, which contain that same question as the Gallup 
Survey (“do you approve of the president…”), yet asks questions such as “Do you think [the 
incumbent] will or will not be able to… [series of questions follow]” (Sigelman and Knight, 
1983: 314-316). Using this framework, they established that at the macro level, the data 
indicated parallels between expectation and approval. At the individual level, they found that 
specific issues performed differently in a correlation analysis with approval but were all 
statistically significant (Sigelman and Knight, 1983: 318-322). Other criticism surrounded the 
definition of the economy, which they thought was faulty, and the exclusion “hard” economic 
indicators. Kernell, instead, argues two main propositions. That, a) contemporary events and 
conditions effect short-term evaluations, and b) current popularity is based upon a reflection 
upon previous months (Kernell, 1978: 509-517).  
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A key aspect of presidential studies that Kernell brought to light is the notion of economic 
influences on presidential popularity. A large body of research was dedicated to studying the 
effects of hard economic indicators such as unemployment, inflation and real income growth 
on presidential popularity. The understanding is that economic conditions produce a lagged 
effect that influences popularity levels of presidents, because people make the rational choice 
of having approval of a president when conditions are good and disapproving when 
conditions are bad. The president is seen as a key role-player in determining economic 
conditions and therefore is held accountable when things are going badly (Norpoth and 
Yantek, 1983: 788). Other studies have expanded on this notion by introducing potentially 
important variables, such as current events, which together with the hard economic 
indicators, produce a stronger predicting model for presidential approval (Mackuen, 1983: 
166-179).  
Prime Ministerial Popularity 
What has to be taken into consideration in the evaluation of the South African president is 
that even though he has the title “president”, he is elected in a manner similar to that of the 
prime minister. South Africans vote for a political party, not a president. Logically, the 
situation is relatively different to that of the United States because the results cannot be 
interpreted in the same manner (for instance, one cannot use popularity results of the prime 
minister to determine potential voting behaviour). However, the importance is not 
diminished. In the past twenty years, there has been a development in literature on 
“Presidentialisation”; a  term which is defined as “the movement over time away from 
collective to personalised government, movement away from a pattern of governmental and 
electoral politics dominated by political party towards one where the party leader becomes a 
more autonomous political force” (Mughan, 2000: 7). This indicates that there is an 
increasing significance of the head of government.  
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The literature which focusses on prime ministerial approval looks at the prospects of the 
prime minister having any effect on levels of party support and whether prime ministerial 
evaluations have any place in analyses. The majority of studies use prime ministerial 
popularity as an independent variable which influences levels of party support. Various 
authors argue that the prime minister is used as a short-cut in decision-making by voters. The 
literature highlights that, even though prime ministers (or in South Africa’s case, the 
president) are not directly elected into their position by the voter, they play a significant role 
in the decision-making process for potential voters. Therefore, analysing the ways in which 
people evaluate leaders in this position still has important consequences (Denver and Garnett, 
2012: 57, Heffernan, 2005: 53, Evans and Andersen, 2005: 818, and Clarke, Ho and Stewart, 
2000: 257-267). The other arm of this debate focuses on the fact that, regardless of their 
personalities, prime ministers (as a variable of measurement) cannot stand alone. Instead, 
they have to be understood in terms of a political, social and economic context (Heffernan, 
2005: 605). 
The Analyses of South African Presidents 
The literature on prime ministers indicates that there is a space for the analysis of a head of 
state in the context of South African governance. Since South Africa was declared a Republic 
in 1961, the country has had six recognised prime ministers (Smuts, Malan, Strijdom, 
Verwoerd, Vorster, and Botha) and six presidents (Botha, de Klerk, Mandela, Mbeki, 
Motlanthe, and Zuma), although PW Botha served as both a prime Minister and president as 
the position of Prime Minister was abolished in 1984 (The Presidency, n.d.). Some of these 
presidents and prime ministers were studied both quantitatively and qualitatively. The latter 
method has received greater attention over time.  
Perhaps the closest academics and researchers have come to a theoretical analysis of 
presidents that includes “variables” is when a conceptual framework was employed to 
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analyse political leadership. Geldenhuys and Kotze (1985 and 1991) analysed P.W. Botha 
and F.W. de Klerk’s style of leadership using Margaret Hermann’s conceptual framework of 
decision-makers/leaders. In the studies, they look at decisions previously made and match 
them to the framework in an aim to possibly determine the types of decisions that will be 
made in future (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1985: 30-34; and 1991: 20-21). Whilst the study 
includes some elements of why the president could be considered popular based on 
personality, it provides no substantive evidence that indicates how popular the president was. 
Quantitative studies of presidential approval in South Africa seems to be limited to 
descriptive analyses.  A perfect example would be the study by Paul Graham and Carmen 
Alpin (2012) on the levels of approval of Jacob Zuma (Using 2011 Round 5 of 
Afrobarometer), which made some interesting, yet predictable, findings. In the case of 
partisanship, they found that ANC supporters had the highest levels of approval for Jacob 
Zuma, whilst the DA supporters had the lowest levels of approval. They also found that high 
levels of poverty influenced levels of approval, as respondents who experienced the highest 
levels of poverty showed the lowest levels of approval (Graham and Alpin, 2012: 2-7).  Even 
though the study of presidents in South Africa is limited, there are other studies which have 
been conducted in South Africa and Africa which may also be helpful to look at.  
Voting Behaviour and Performance Evaluation 
The most prevalent study of public evaluations in South Africa is the topic of voting 
behaviour. Most studies indicate that choice of party is driven by race and partisanship, 
although recent literature suggests a movement away from race, towards other factors. Pierre 
Du Toit indicates that race, partisanship and voting behaviour are strongly correlated in the 
1994 elections, with some indications that race is, rather, an indication of identity rather than 
the “race” as colour (Du Toit, 2009). Norris and Mattes explore the role of ethnicity in 
support for the governing party. They do so by using Afrobarometer data to determine levels 
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of partisanship, which they conclude are relatively ethnically related (Norris and Mattes, 
2003: 1). Ferree looks at the race question, and explores two hypotheses; 1) that “racial 
voting results as voters use the ballot box to express their identities as members of racial 
groups”, and 2) “explains racial voting through non-racial factors” (performance and policy 
evaluation) (Ferree, 2006: 803). Habib and Naidu analyse the aspects of race, identity and 
social status or income, as predictors for electoral behaviour (Habib and Naidu, 2006). 
There seems to be an indication that, given South Africa’s history, identity shapes the way 
South Africans think and behave. Horowitz (1985) claims that individuals express support for 
members of the same ethnic group, irrespective of the leader’s party affiliation or who its 
leader is. According to John Dunn, people seek someone to represent them “perfectly as 
individuals”. In the absence of a perfect fit, they will settle for someone who is as similar as 
possible. This means that political leaders are often able to rely on consistent support from 
members of the same ethnic group (Horowitz, 1985: 294-320). This concept of ascribing 
support on the basis of ethnicity is referred to as the study of co-ethnicity; supporting an 
individual because they are a co-ethnic2. In poorer societies, voters do not have the means to 
do research on political parties and candidates. Instead, they will regard the co-ethnic as 
someone who understands their wants and needs and therefore will represent them i.e. 
identifying the co-ethnic is the cheapest form of information gathering (Hislope, 2005: 578). 
There is another body of literature that argues that information gathering which informs 
political behaviour is more complex to understand than the co-ethnic hypothesis would 
suggest. Lodge and Hamill (1986: 505-506) argue that every person has an “effective 
cognitive framework” which influences the way they process information, and consequently, 
the decisions they make. This framework is developed through “sophistication” i.e. the levels 
of education of the individual. The sophistication argument has been further developed 
                                                          
2 For more on co-ethnicity, refer to Habyarimana et al, 2007; Robinson, 2009; and Chandra, 2006 
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through work suggesting that in addition to people’s level of education, what drives levels of 
regime support is their awareness of public affairs (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005: 
35-36). Even if people are poorly informed, they are still able to use “low information 
reasoning” by drawing from immediate circumstances to arrive at short-term economic and 
political performance evaluations (Bratton and Mattes, 2007: 199).  
Another body of literature that looks at the fact that people draw from their circumstances to 
reach conclusions is that surrounding economic performance evaluations. Whilst in western 
literature researchers were able to explore this hypothesis in the form of the 
expectation/disillusionment theory, in Africa, the concept of economic performance 
evaluation was explored as a more straight-forward performance evaluation (testing 
expectation/disillusionment requires a longitudinal panel study which is unavailable in Africa 
at present). The theory on performance evaluations is grounded in rational choice. It contends 
that if people believe that they are receiving material benefits from politicians or governing 
systems they will offer higher levels of support for these politicians or governing systems. 
These material benefits include economic goods, and basic social services (Bratton, Mattes 
and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005: 42-43). In voting behaviour, this phenomenon is referred to as 
“pocketbook voting” – where voters give support for a party or person based upon what they 
have gained or stand to gain from that person or party being in office (Elinder, Jordahl and 
Poutvaara, 2008: 1).  
The last form of performance evaluation I would like to discuss is the theory of the Gender 
Gap. The Gender Gap can be defined as an all-encompassing occurrence within political 
science where men and women have differing opinions on a multitude of political issues 
(Inglehart and Norris, 2000:422). The basis of this argument is that women are less likely to 
be proponents of an aggressive style of politics, such as going to war with others, and are 
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more likely to approve of physical, emotional and economic security (Box-Steffensmeier et 
al, 2004:516).  
Inglehart and Norris (2000) argue that there are three types of gender gaps that have arisen in 
societies based upon their level development; the traditional gender gap- where women are 
perceived to be generally more conservative (right) in their political stance than men-, the 
pattern of “gender dealignment”- where women and men had little difference in opinion, 
more particularly towards voting behaviour and partisanship- and the modern gender gap 
which shows a pattern of gender realignment- this takes place in post-industrial societies and 
sees women as being more liberal (left) than men. South Africa is classified as a 
developmental society in their analysis, and therefore is placed under the group that ought to 
have a traditional gender gap, where women are more conservative than men, according to 
Inglehart and Norris’ theory. The ANC describes itself as a social democratic, centre-left 
party. As a representative of this party, each South African president may serve as a symbol 
of the centre-left ANC. There are certain events during each presidency that could provide as 
a catalyst to existing leftist ideology, and it is during these times that we expect to see even 
greater difference between men and women. 
Conclusion 
The literature review indicates that there is indeed a lack of research on presidential or prime 
ministerial popularity in Africa and South Africa. In particular, there is a lack of quantitative 
studies and especially multivariate studies on this topic. However, I find that Western 
literature, and especially presidential studies in the USA has laid an adequate foundation for 
the field of presidential/prime ministerial studies. In addition, performance evaluation and 
voting behaviour research in Africa and South Africa has revealed some interesting and 
noteworthy factors which need to be considered when addressing popularity and approval 
studies in South Africa. I will draw from some of the predictor variables mentioned in these 
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studies which are relevant to South Africa and, using the available data, try to answer my 
own research questions. 
Research Hypotheses 
Given the literature and what I know about South Africa, I have three hypotheses which I will 
test in this thesis. I will call them the Identity hypothesis, the Performance Evaluations 
hypothesis and the Cognitive Awareness hypothesis. Each hypothesis is grounded in pre-
existing theories of approval or evaluation. I intend to use these theories to guide my 
research.   
The Identity Hypothesis: 
The first hypothesis I will be testing is the Identity hypothesis. Given what we know about 
South Africa I expect that identity plays a strong role in people’s evaluations. Drawing from 
previous studies of co-ethnicity, I will test a co-identity hypothesis. I anticipate that I should 
be able to test if South Africans share an identity trait with the president in any given year 
they will be more likely to approve of him. Given this logic, my main hypothesis is:   
H1: South Africans evaluate the president based upon whether they are a co-ethnic of 
the president. 
I use the word co-ethnic, but this includes ethnicity, race, gender, where they come from, and 
their partisanship. For H1 to be true, I should find a positive relationship between Presidential 
Approval and all of my independent co-identity variables in a given survey year.  
The Performance Evaluations Hypothesis: 
My second hypothesis is based upon the performance evaluation work of Bratton, Mattes and 
Gyimah-Boadi. This hypothesis would be a contending hypothesis to the Identity hypothesis 
because it would argue that people have moved beyond thinking about evaluations on the 
basis of who is leading and are now making rational choices about what they have and what 
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the president and his government is offering. We would expect that if South Africans are 
rational, when they believe that government is performing well in terms of the economy and 
social services, there should be a higher likelihood of there being higher levels of approval 
for the president. Using their logic, my second hypothesis is:  
H2: South Africans evaluate the president based upon their perception of 
government’s performance on economic conditions and their perception of the 
economy. 
I refer to economic conditions, but this is an umbrella term to encompass macro-economic 
conditions, social services, and their ability to protect the economy to some degree. For H2 to 
be true, I should find a positive relationship between both performance evaluation variables 
and my dependent variable. Once again, I hope to find that the hypothesis stands for each 
year analysed.  
The Cognitive Awareness Hypothesis: 
My third hypothesis moves away from people considering who they are and what they have, 
and moves towards what people know. With the Cognitive Awareness hypothesis, I will be 
testing if differing levels of education, news media usage and political discussion with others 
presents as differing levels of approval. In fact, we may argue that highly educated and highly 
informed individuals ought to have the ability to analyse political events more critically 
(owning to their having a wider range of facts to draw from), and therefore be more critical of 
the president or hold him accountable for his actions (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 
2005: 40-41). I will test this hypothesis by determining if the level of education has an impact 
on levels of approval. Secondly, I will test whether the respondent’s use of media resources 
influences the way the decisions they make. Lastly, I will look at the level of political 
discussion the respondent engages in. Therefore my third hypothesis I will be testing is:  
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H3: South Africans evaluate the president based upon their cognitive awareness. 
For H3 to be true, I expect to find that each variable significantly related to my independent 
variable in each year analysed. Owing to the two streams of thought demonstrated in my 
logic, I am not looking for both a positive or negative significant relationship between my 
dependent and independent variables.  
Research Design 
In order to conduct my multivariate analysis of Presidential Approval, I will use cross-
sectional data in the form of an IDASA Diversity Study from 1997, and Afrobarometer data 
from 2000 to 2015. This consists of Round 1 (2000), Round 2 (2002), Round 2.5 (2004), 
Round 3 (2006), Round 4 (2008), Round 5 (2011) and Round 6 (2015) data. According to 
their website, “Afrobarometer is an African-led, non-partisan survey research project that 
measures citizen attitudes on democracy and governance, the economy, civil society, and 
other topics”. Furthermore, the IDASA diversity study was considered to be one of three 
projects that later led to the formation of Afrobarometer (Afrobarometer, n.d.).  
Concepts and Measurement 
Using the IDASA and Afrobarometer surveys, I draw from specific questions to match up to 
concepts I have created to test my hypotheses. The dependant variable is “Presidential 
Approval”. Presidential Approval will be measured with the question in all surveys that asks 
respondents “Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have 
performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 
say? [The incumbent]”. This question is consistently measured by asking respondents 
whether they “Strongly Disapprove”, “Disapprove”, “Approve”, “Strongly Approve” or 
“Don’t Know/Haven’t Heard Enough to Say”. For the purpose of this study, I will have 
excluded Don’t Know responses. 
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The independent variables are a set of factors that help to test the hypotheses. In this case, the 
independent variables for the Identity hypothesis are Co-race, Co-ethnicity, Co-gender, Co-
region and Co-partisan. The independent variables for the Performance Evaluation hypothesis 
are Macro-Economic Goods and Social Services. The independent variables for the Cognitive 
Awareness hypothesis are Education, Media Usage in the form of Newspaper usage, 
Television usage and Radio usage, and Political Discussion.  
To test the Identity hypothesis, I created five dichotomous variables to represent the Co-
identity characteristics. Each variable changes depending on the president of the year in 
question. In each year, 0 represents the other respondents and 1 represents the Co-identity 
variable. Table 2.1 indicates what the Co-identity variable looks like in each year. With the 0-
1 coding, what we expect is that the higher score will mean a movement towards being more 
co-ethnic, co-racial etc. with the president. This makes it easier to read the Beta coefficients 
as we can read a positive Beta coefficient as a positive relationship between the co-identity 
variable and Presidential Approval, and a negative Beta coefficient indicates a negative 
relationship.  
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Table 2.1: Co-identity categories for South Africa Presidents 1997-2015 
 1997 
Nelson 
Mandela 
2000 
Thabo 
Mbeki 
2002 
Thabo 
Mbeki 
2004 
Thabo 
Mbeki 
2006 
Thabo 
Mbeki 
2008 
Thabo 
Mbeki 
2011 
Jacob 
Zuma 
2015 
Jacob 
Zuma 
Co-Race Black Black Black Black Black Black Black Black 
Co-
Ethnicity 
Xhosa Xhosa Xhosa Xhosa Xhosa Xhosa Zulu Zulu 
Co-Gender Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male 
Co-Region Eastern 
Cape 
Eastern 
Cape 
Eastern 
Cape 
Eastern 
Cape 
Eastern 
Cape 
Eastern 
Cape 
Kwa-Zulu 
Natal 
Kwa-Zulu 
Natal 
Co-Partisan ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC ANC 
 
To test the Performance Evaluation hypothesis, I will use the two concepts referred to by 
Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi – Macro-Economic Goods and Social Services. A third 
concept which I will call “Economic Safety” will also be tested. These concepts will be 
measured using survey items that measure government’s ability to handle a specific set of 
responses as set out by the Afrobarometer surveys. Each question item is measured on a four 
point scale- Very Badly, Fairly Badly, Fairly Well, and Very Well. Unfortunately, data is 
unavailable to test this hypothesis in 1997.  
Additionally, to ensure reliability of the measurement, I have chosen variables that are 
consistently used in all rounds analysed. Lastly, I filtered out variables that did not match the 
concepts. Appendix I shows the question items that have been selected for the analysis based 
upon their availability in all rounds. I then tested the factorability of the ten items which 
remained using the 2015 R6 data. I found that every item correlated with at least one other 
item in the analysis, which may suggest reasonable factorability (See Appendix II).  The 
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Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.88, which is commonly accepted 
as a great and well above the recommended measure of 0.6, and the Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity was significant (χ2 (45) =7327.42, p<0.001). The communalities of all variables 
were above zero, indicating that each item shared common variance with another (see 
Appendix III). This information indicates that a factor analysis will be useful for these items.  
A factor analysis was conducted using the Maximum Likelihood method of extraction and a 
Direct Oblimin rotation. The results indicated that there were two factors with initial 
Eigenvalues over 1. The first factor accounted for 41.96% of the variance and the second 
factor accounted for 14.09% of the variance.  Appendix IV indicates how each of the ten 
items loaded on to one of the two factors. However, I do believe that Reducing Crime and 
Fighting Corruption is not a conceptual match to “Macro-Economic Goods” and, instead, 
should be captured in a third concept “Economic Safety”. To ensure that my concepts convert 
into reliable indices, I conducted a reliability analysis of the three concepts. The analysis 
indicated that all three measures were reliable, as seen in Table 2.2, which also contains the 
question items which will form each index.  
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Table 2.2: Question items measuring Macro-Economic Goods, Social Services, and 
Economic Safety 
Concept Question Item Cronbach’s Alpha 
Macro-Economic Goods Managing the Economy .78 
Creating Jobs 
Keeping Prices Down 
Narrowing Income Gaps 
Social Services Improving Basic Health 
Services 
.75 
Addressing Educational Needs 
Providing Water and Sanitation 
Services 
Distributing Welfare Payments 
To Those Who Are Entitled 
Economic Safety Reducing Crime .64 
Fighting Corruption 
 
Lastly, I will test a fourth concept called “Economic Perception”. I will test people’s 
perception of the country’s economy by creating an index consisting of three questions 
measured in Afrobarometer. The first question measures South Africans’ perception of the 
economy at the point of survey. It asks people to rate “The present economic conditions of 
this country”. The responses range from “Very Good”, “Fairly Good”, “Neither Good nor 
Bad”, “Fairly Bad”, to “Very Bad”. The second and third question asks South Africans to 
“rate economic conditions in this country compared to twelve months ago” and whether they 
“expect economic conditions in this country to be better or worse in twelve months’ time”3. 
The responses range from “much worse”, “worse”, “same”, “better” and “much better”. All 
three questions are measured on a Likert scale with the middle option indicating neutrality. I 
                                                          
3 Wording based upon Afrobarometer R6 survey 
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conducted a reliability analysis of the three question items and the Cronbach’s Alpha = .65, 
indicating that the index is a reliable measure of one concept.  
The third, Cognitive Awareness hypothesis will be tested using four question items to 
measure Media Usage, Education and Political Discussion. Media Usage will be measured 
with three items. These questions measure the frequency of using newspapers, radio, and 
television, measuring frequency as “Never”, “Less than once a month”, “A few times a 
month”, “A few times a week”, or “Everyday”. Education is measured from (0) No formal 
schooling to (9) Post-Graduate education. Political Discussion will be measured with 
responses indicating that respondents (0) Never, (1) Occasionally or (2) Frequently discuss 
politics with others. Table 2.3 indicates which question items where used from the IDASA 
and Afrobarometer Surveys. I have used the wording which has been most frequently used in 
all surveys.  
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Table 2.3: Dependent Variables 
Hypothesis Concept  Afrobarometer Survey Item(s) 
Identity Race Item Respondent’s Race 
 Ethnicity Item What is your ethnic community, cultural 
group or tribe? 
 Region Item Region/Province 
 Partisanship Item Which party is that? 
 Gender Item Respondent’s Gender 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Macro-
Economic 
Index How well or badly would you say the 
current government is handling the 
following matters, or haven’t heard enough 
to say? 
- Managing the Economy 
- Creating Jobs 
- Keeping prices Down 
- Narrowing Income Gaps 
 Social Services Index How well or badly would you say the 
current government is handling the 
following matters, or haven’t heard enough 
to say? 
- Improving Basic Health Services 
- Addressing Educational Needs 
- Providing Water and Sanitation 
- Combatting HIV/AIDS 
- Distributing welfare payments to those 
who are entitled to them (such as old age 
pensions, disability pensions, child support 
grants) 
 Economic 
Safety 
Index How well or badly would you say the 
current government is handling the 
following matters, or haven’t heard enough 
to say? 
- Reducing Crime 
- Fighting Corruption 
 Economic 
Perception 
Construct How would you describe the present 
economic condition of this country? 
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Looking back, how do you rate the 
economic conditions in this country 
compared to twelve months ago? 
Looking ahead, do you expect economic 
conditions in this country to be better or 
worse in twelve months’ time? 
Cognitive Awareness Education Item What is the highest level of education you 
have completed? 
 Radio Usage Item How often do you get news from the 
following sources? 
- Radio 
 Television 
Usage 
Item How often do you get news from the 
following sources? 
- Television 
 Newspaper 
Usage 
Item How often do you get news from the 
following sources? 
- Newspapers 
 Political 
Discussion 
Item How often do you discuss politics and 
government with other people? 
    
 
Questionnaire design and comparability 
There are a few issues related to the IDASA and Afrobarometer surveys that I would like to 
clarify as they may have an impact on results or the ability to compare findings across years. 
The first issue, which has already been mentioned, is the fact that questions measuring 
government’s ability to handle certain things is not measured in the IDASA survey. 
Therefore, the Performance Evaluation hypothesis will only be tested between 2000 and 
2015, and across two presidencies.  
The second issue pertains to the measure of Ethnicity across surveyed years. In Round 1 and 
Round 2, Ethnicity is not consistently measured as in other years. In R1, they asked South 
Africans “Besides being South African, which group do you feel you belong to”? Responses 
ranged from ethnic, linguistic, religious or racial identities, to economic standing/occupation 
33 
 
(“middle class” or “teacher”), position relative to the community (“traditional leader”) or 
even position relative to the household (“housewife”) to mention a few. This does mean that 
there is room for overlap- a respondent can be a “black” “African” “xhosa” and “Christian”, 
yet all of these groups are represented separately. In R2, Ethnicity is not measured at all. I do 
want to stick to keeping the concept of Ethnicity because of its historical significance. 
However, because of the lack of or unreliability of data in R1 and R2, I will use a proxy 
measure in those two rounds. I did a crosstabulation of Ethnicity and Language in Rounds 
2.5, 3, 4, 5, and 6, and found that there is a high level of overlap between these two concepts, 
as shown in Table 2.4.  
Table 2.4: Percentage Co-ethnic respondents who spoke the co-language 
Round 
% Co-ethnic that speaks Co-
language 
2.5 93.2% 
3 96.6% 
4 97.2% 
5 94.5% 
6 96.0% 
 
In any surveyed year, more than 90% of respondents who identified as the co-ethnic also 
indicated that they spoke the co-language, or rather, the language commonly associated with 
that ethnic group. Given this high level of overlap, I will use Language as Ethnicity in those 
two rounds.  
In R2.5, the Afrobarometer had a different measurement scale for “Political Discussion”. 
Instead of the usual three-point scale, it had a five-point scale. I have recoded the values as 
shown in Table 2.5. 
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 Table 2.5: Recodes for R2.5 Political Discussion variable.  
R2.5 Coding 
New codes (consistent with 
other rounds) 
0 No, would never do this 
0 Never 1 No, but would do if I had a 
chance 
2 Yes, once or twice 
2 Occasionally 
3 Yes, several times 
4 Yes, often 3 Frequently 
9 Don’t Know 9 Don’t Know 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The South African presidents and the public 
This chapter aims to illustrate the variation in the dependent variable Presidential Approval at 
the descriptive level. I aim to explore patterns and trends in Presidential Approval in relation 
to important economic, political and social occurrences in South Africa at a given time that 
may have influenced trends in approval. I will also use bivariate analysis to look at the nature 
of approval between various demographic groups. Nelson Mandela was the president from 
1994 to 1999, Thabo Mbeki from 1999 to 2004 and then again from 2004 to 2008, when his 
term ended with his resignation. South Africans were still surveyed that year and asked what 
they thought of Mbeki. In 2009, Jacob Zuma became president and is the incumbent. Each 
president had moments when they seemed popular or unpopular during their term/s. The 
question is, do these moments translate into perceptions of  the public? 
According to IDASA/Afrobarometer, the levels of approval vary across the surveyed years. 
These levels of approval are validated by a similar trend in data generated by survey research 
company Ipsos-Markinor (see Figure 3.1).  
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Figure 3.1: % Levels of Approval of the President of South Africa4 
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In Table 3.1 I have added the percentage of respondents in the Afrobarometer and IDASA 
surveys who said that they “Strongly Approve” and “Approve” of the president. It is evident 
that Afrobarometer and Ipsos-Markinor data follows a similar trend, even if the levels of 
approval are not equal. The only point the two lines seem to split is in 2009, but this can be 
attributed to the fact that it was President Zuma’s first approval rating and Afrobarometer 
conducted a survey only in 2011, three years later.  
                                                          
4 “Markinor” percentages represent averages of surveys taken in a specific year, as they sometimes did three 
surveys in one year where they explored approval levels of the president, whilst “IDASA & Afrobarometer” 
percentages refer to both IDASA and Afrobarometer percentages. 
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Table 3.1: Levels of Approval of the Presidents of South Africa by President5 
President Year IDASA/AB 
Ipsos 
Markinor 
AB 
Mean 
Mandela 
1995 76 
 
73 
1996 
  
1997 64 
 
1998 79 80 
1999 
 
74 
Mbeki 
2000 50 63 
61 
2001 
 
56 
2002 51 55 
2003 
 
62 
2004 73 76 
2005 
 
78 
2006 77 73 
2007 
 
67 
2008 55 
 
Zuma 
2009 
 
77 
51 
2010  62 
2011 66 61 
2012  54 
2013  46 
2014 
 
51 
2015 36 
 
 
As Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 indicate, the highest percentage of approval received using 
Afrobarometer data is 79% by Nelson Mandela in 1998. The lowest Afrobarometer approval 
point is was 36% by Zuma in 2015. It is worth noting that in the 2006, Mbeki received the 
                                                          
5 For the purpose of these statistics, “Don’t Know” responses have been left out.   
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second highest approval percentage recorded by Afrobarometer amongst presidents at 77%. 
Mandela had the highest mean score during his presidency at 73%.  
As mentioned in the literature review, various authors have have made attempts to explain 
Presidential Approval. The majority of these cases resorted to a macro-level analysis of 
approval and its correlation to events and conditions at that time. Three possibilities that I 
would like to address and explore is; that the expression of levels of approval happens in a 
cyclical manner (Mueller’s Cyclical Model); that levels of approval often coincide with 
fluctuations in the economy (as Mackuen et al argued); or that people take current events into 
consideration when deciding on whether they like the president or not (as Kernell argued). 
Figure 3.2: Approval Levels of the South African Presidents, with shaded presidential eras 
 
The presidential periods indicate some possible support of the Cyclical model that Mueller 
speaks about in his book War, Presidents and Public Opinion (1973). Whilst the question 
was not asked in 1994, the year Mandela was elected to the presidency, IDASA data for 1995 
and 1997 indicates fairly high levels of approval (in Figure 3.2 the Mandela era is shaded in 
blue). Following 1995, there is a dip in approval levels (an occurrence Mueller says can be 
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expected following the president’s election) then followed by an increase towards the end of 
his presidency. What we see in both surveys following the 1999 election is a steady decline in 
approval levels, which continues up until 2002, the middle of Mbeki’s first term (Mbeki’s 
terms are shaded in green). We then see a steady increase up until 2005 (a year after the 
election) in the Ipsos data and 2006 (two years after the election) in the Afrobarometer data. 
Following the 2009 election, we once again see an incline in support of the new president, 
Jacob Zuma, followed by a steep decline in support following the second election in 2014, 
with a slight incline on the Ipsos data (Zuma’s terms are shaded in yellow). During these 
times we do see some evidence of the cyclical model, although it is important to note that the 
data Mueller uses has more data points than Afrobarometer and Ipsos because the Gallup 
survey is conducted more frequently.  
Mueller also argued that unemployment may result in further declines- higher unemployment 
means lower levels of approval. Figure 3.3 indicates, it was during the highest levels of 
unemployment that Thabo Mbeki experienced his lowest levels of approval in 2000 and 
2002. However, the evidence does not perfectly fit our expectation because in Mbeki’s 
decline in popularity from 77% in 2006 to 55% in 2008 occurs at the same time as when 
South Africa experiences its lowest levels of unemployment in 10 years. Following a slight 
rise in unemployment between 2007 and 2010, levels of unemployment are relatively stable 
between 2010 and 2015. However, this is also the period where we see the greatest decline in 
approval levels of the president (Zuma).  
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Figure 3.3: Level of Unemployment in South Africa and Level of Presidential Approval in 
South Africa 
 
Two other concepts which have commonly been looked at when analysing the economic 
environment are Inflation and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Inflation is defined as “the 
rate at which the general level of prices for goods and services is rising and, consequently, the 
purchasing power of currency is falling.”6 It is measured using the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) and Producer Price Index (PPI). In this instance I will use the CPI because this 
measures “the rate of change in the prices of goods and services purchased by consumers” 
which I find more applicable when analysing the attitudes of the consumers i.e. the South 
African citizens (StatsSA, n.d.). What I expect to find is that when there are higher levels of 
Inflation, then there will be lower levels of approval of the president. As indicated in Figure 
3.4, the annual average CPI inflation in 2003 and 2004 was on decline, followed by four 
years of increasing annual CPI inflation levels. In 2008, South Africa had their highest level 
of annual CPI inflation since entering into a democracy. It is evident that two of the three 
                                                          
6 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/inflation.asp 
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approval levels within the 50%-60% category coincides with South Africa’s two highest 
annual CPI inflation levels- 9.2% in 2002, when approval levels were 51%, and 11.5% in 
2008, when approval levels were 55%. In two out of the four approval levels that lie in the 
70%-80% category, inflation was at its lowest- 1.4% in 2004, when approval was at 73%, and 
4.6% when approval was 77%. However, during the Mandela era, inflation was relatively 
high- 8.7% in 1995, 7.4% in 1996, 8.6% in 1997 and 6.9% in 1998, yet his approval levels 
were consistently high as well- 76% in 1995, 64% in 1997 and 79% in 1998. This may be as 
a result of coming out of Apartheid and recovering from economic sanctions. Another period 
that once again does not match our expectation is during Zuma’s presidency, where we see 
stable CPI inflation levels ranging between 4.3% in 2010 at the lowest point and 6.4% 2014 
at the highest, yet a steep decline in approval between 2011 and 2015.  
Figure 3.4: % Annual average CPI inflation in South Africa and Levels of Presidential 
Approval in South Africa 
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The last economic condition that I will consider is GDP in South Africa. What I expect to 
find is that if the percentage GDP per capita is higher, then we will see higher levels of 
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approval of the president. As shown in Figure 3.5, most notable declines in annual percentage 
GDP growth took place between 1996 and 1998- when the Asian Financial crisis occurred- as 
well as between 2007 and 2009- when the Global Financial Crisis occurred. Most notable 
increases in annual percentage GDP would be between 1998 and 2000, the steady climb 
between 2003 and 2006- a probable result of GEAR- and then the sharp increase between 
2009 and 2010. It seems that during Mandela era, there is no relation between approval levels 
and economic growth. In fact, Mandela enjoyed his highest level of support during the Asian 
Financial Crisis, despite the effect it had on the weakened South African economy. It does 
seem that at some point during Mbeki’s time in office- particularly during the time of steady 
economic growth- that the levels of approval seem to correspond with the change in annual 
percentage GDP growth. It is most notable that Mbeki’s fall in popularity coincides with the 
drop in economic growth. We see that during Zuma’s terms, the rise in GDP coincides with 
Zuma’s higher levels of approval and declines in GDP coincides with declines in approval.  
Figure 3.5: % Annual GDP Growth in South Africa and Presidential Approval in South 
Africa 
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However, this does point to the importance of considering current events. We can’t tell if the 
lower levels of approval coincides more with the weak economic performance, or with the 
resignation of Mbeki- which perhaps also played a role in the percentage GDP growth for 
that time.  
Since 1994, there have been some events which, in its portrayal in the media, seemed to have 
a greater impact on society than others. These events were either seen as newsworthy, or they 
received a more intense reaction from the public, whether good or bad. Could it be that these 
events played a role in people’s attitudes? As I have touched on in the section above, it seems 
that there are events that may correlate with an increase or decrease in approval levels. It is 
important to note that this type of analysis is better done with data that is taken more 
frequently. Nonetheless, we can still analyse events within a given year or period and 
determine whether they coincide with levels of approval.  
Figure 3.6 indicates when certain newsworthy and impressing events occurred along with the 
levels of approval. Even though media tends to lean towards publishing negative events, I am 
also outlining positive events in an attempt to ensure that there is no bias towards only 
negative news having an effect.  
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Figure 3.6: Important events that occurred in South Africa and Presidential Approval in South 
Africa 
 
Whilst there are many events that occur on a day to day basis that may be considered as 
possible triggers for changes in attitudes, I have highlighted some events that seem to have 
some significance when they occurred- particularly because they were highly publicised 
events that often dominated the news for some time. We find evidence that in years when 
Mbeki was highly criticised in the media- particularly for his AIDS denialism and his 
contestation for a third term as ANC leader (which peaked at the ANC Polokwane 
conference)- he seemed to slump in the ratings. We also find that when South Africa was in a 
tumultuous place, dealing with an electricity crisis, a global recession, xenophobic attacks, 
and Mbeki’s resignation, approval levels were also particularly low. Similarly, we find that 
by 2015, when Zuma had the lowest levels of approval, the news had been dominated by the 
Marikana Massacre in 2012, the investigation into the misuse of state funds by Zuma 
(Nkandlagate), the death of Nelson Mandela (I have already highlighted the memorial service 
in my introduction) and another electricity crisis.  
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Demography of Presidential Approval 
In this section, I aim to map out who in South Africa does or does not approve of the 
president at the bivariate level. I will break down approval ratings according to major 
demographic categories in an attempt to explore where approval and disapproval lies, and if 
there are any preliminary patterns that can be seen. As already mentioned in chapter two, 
voting behaviour in South Africa is said to be a racial census.  
Figure 3.7: Percentage Approval of the President, ANC Vote, and ANC Vote of the Voting 
Age Population 
 
Yet in Figure 3.7 we find that there is significantly less variance in the percentage of votes 
received by the ANC in each national election than the levels of approval of the president. 
Additionally, the percentage of votes the ANC receives based on the voter age population is 
just as stable, although on a stable decline. Either way we are finding that the levels are more 
stable than the levels of Presidential Approval. This indicates that I should expect to find 
something different to voting behaviour analysts.  
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Who Approves? 
In Figure 3.8 below, by adding the Strongly Approve and Approve categories, I managed to 
produce a level of Approval by race. As a result of the small and in some years non-existent 
N in some years, East Asian, Arab and Other have been excluded from this graph. This table 
indicates that in each year, black South Africans are more likely to approve of the president 
than any other race. The graph indicates that approval is not a perfect racial census- in fact it 
is very unlikely that we would expect every black respondent to say they approve of the 
president. However, we do find that if the respondent is black then there is a higher likelihood 
that the respondent approves of the president compared to other races.  
 Figure 3.8: Afrobarometer Percentage Approval of the President by Race 
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This graph also shows that up until 2004, indian and white South Africans were more likely 
to disapprove of the president than coloured or black respondents. 2006 saw an upsurge in 
approval by all races except coloured South Africans, followed by plummeting levels in 
2008. This is expected, considering the previous tables we looked at showed that approval 
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levels drastically dropped in 2008. The same can be found in 2015 where we find all time low 
scores in each racial category.  
Similarly, when analysing approval levels by province, I found that approval levels dropped 
in every province in 2008. Table 3.2 shows approval levels in each province, with increases 
in approval levels shaded in dark green and decreasing levels shaded in a light green. There 
also seemed to be a general decrease in approval in 2000, with the exception of the Northern 
Cape province and the Western Cape province. It seems that there is a general upward trend 
in most provinces between 2004 and 2006. There does not seem to be an obvious trend in a 
specific province- no province is more approving of all presidents than another and the 
responses are varied. What we do see is possible tell-tale signs of some provinces being 
preferring their co-regional president- something I will test for later in my multi-variate 
analysis. We see that even though South Africans from Kwa-Zulu Natal tend to give 
relatively low scores (their mean score is 59%) in 2011, they gave their highest score for 
homeboy Jacob Zuma (81.6%). However, it is not particularly visible that South Africans 
from the Eastern Cape were more approving of Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela. There are 
years when Thabo Mbeki has relatively low scores in the Eastern Cape. However, after 2002, 
Mbeki received relatively high scores in the Eastern Cape, even when he went through the 
2008 slump. The Eastern Cape is also responsible for giving Jacob Zuma his lowest score- a 
possible indication of homeground alliances being formed. 
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Table 3.2: Afrobarometer Percentage Approval of the President by Province 
 
1997 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2011 2015 
Eastern Cape 61% 48% 61% 90% 87% 78% 45% 39% 
Free State 75% 73% 72% 77% 98% 62% 75% 31% 
Gauteng 71% 53% 36% 66% 71% 63% 64% 21% 
Kwazulu Natal 56% 41% 52% 75% 68% 40% 82% 56% 
Limpopo 76% 63% 72% 63% 80% 44% 72% 28% 
Mpumalanga 82% 52% 62% 79% 87% 57% 82% 50% 
North West 78% 46% 68% 79% 88% 59% 68% 33% 
Northern Cape 54% 73% 68% 84% 89% 74% 54% 23% 
Western Cape 56% 63% 47% 71% 73% 49% 46% 31% 
Cells are shaded to easily identify increases and decreases in approval from one year surveyed to another. Lighter 
shades indicate a decrease, and darker shades indicate an increase from the previous year surveyed. 
 
The Western Cape province is the only province that has been governed by more than one 
party since 1994. It is the only province that has managed to gather a sizable opposition. In 
1994 it was one of two provinces that did not elect the ANC as the provincial government 
(the National Party won), and in the 2009 and 2014 provincial election, the Democratic 
Alliance has managed to win the majority of votes in the Western Cape province. One might 
suspect that this opposition may translate to lower levels of approval. With the exception of 
2000, the Western Cape province is the only province to consistently score below the mean 
level of approval; however, this pattern is not particularly outstanding as there are provinces 
that average lower levels of approval than they do.  
In this section I will try to distinguish what approval levels look like amongst ANC 
supporters, Opposition supporters and Apartisans-who for the purpose of this paper I will 
refer to as Independents. We would expect to find that ANC supporters are more supportive 
of their leader than opposition supporters and independents.  In Afrobarometer, respondents 
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are asked a two part question to determine whether they support a party, and if yes, which 
party. I am treating respondents who said that they did not support any party or those who 
said that they do not know if they support any party as independents. Of those who said yes, I 
will divide them into two groups mentioned above; ANC supporters and opposition 
supporters.  
Figure 3.9 tells us that a large majority of the respondents in 1997 and 2000 were 
independents. Thereafter, there seems to be similar numbers of ANC supporters and 
independents, with the exception of 2006 and 2015 where there was a larger number of ANC 
supporters than independents and opposition supporters.   
Figure 3.9: Afrobarometer Percentage Respondents who felt close to particular political party 
 
Figure 3.10 indicates the proportion of ANC supporters, opposition supporters and 
independents that approve of the president. As I expected, the proportion of ANC 
respondents who said that they approved of the president is higher in every year than 
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opposition supporters and independents. It also makes sense that in six out of the eight 
surveyed years, opposition supporters were proportionally less likely to approve of the 
president than any other group, and that independents are in the middle. In voting behaviour, 
it’s believed that you can still swing the vote of the independent in favour of the ruling party, 
whereas it is less likely to do so with opposition supporters. Perhaps the same can be said for 
approval of the president. We find that in most years, with the exception of independents in 
2002 and opposition supporters in 2011, all three lines follow the same trend, even if by a 
few percentage points. Understandably we see sharp declines in approval in 2015, but we see 
that this decline is particularly noticeable in the Opposition and Independent group, with a 
drop of 29% and 39% respectively.  
Figure 3.10: Afrobarometer Percentage Approval of the President by Partisanship 
 
 
An important demographic statistic is age, which explores whether there are possible 
generational differences that influence the way people think. What I expect is that, over time, 
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we should see differences in the way different age groups approve of the president. For the 
purpose of this analysis, I have created generational cohorts based upon the work of Mattes 
(2011). He argues that there are five generations in South Africa and these generations were 
formed based upon the political nature when people were sixteen. These generations are the 
Pre-Apartheid generation, the Early Apartheid generation, the Grand Apartheid generation, 
the Struggle generation and the Born Free Generation. Appendix V demonstrates what the 
ages of people within a generation are in each surveyed year. It is evident in Appendix VI 
that the Pre-Apartheid generation being surveyed is shrinking as the sample of people who 
were sixteen in 1948 is dying out. It is also evident that there are no Born Frees- those who 
turned sixteen after Apartheid fell- in 1997, as they were sixteen in 1997 and were not old 
enough to be sampled, but they are becoming a proportionally greater part of society. I expect 
to find that older generations may have higher levels of approval because of their loyalty to 
the president and his party who freed them. I also expect younger generations to be more 
critical of the president.    
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Figure 3.10: Afrobarometer Approval of the President by Generational cohort 
 
However, Figure 3.10 indicates that there is no pattern of approval as no one generational 
cohort consistently approves any more or less than the other. Appendix VII shows the 
percentage approval of the president by generational cohort, and the numbers indicate that 
there is not much variation. The two years with the greatest range are 2000 (15%) and 2015 
(18%) where we find that the Born Frees and Early Apartheid generation respectively are a 
lot more approving than the other groups.  
Similarly with levels of education, as Table 3.3 indicates, there is not one particular group 
that consistently had the lowest or highest levels across all years. What we find is that all 
groups showed declining levels of approval in 2008, followed by increasing levels of 
approval in 2011 and then declining levels again in 2015.  
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Table 3.3: % Approval amongst different levels of education 
 
1997 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2011 2015 
No formal 
schooling 
79% 65% 68% 82% 81% 64% 73% 44% 
Informal 
schooling only 
N/A* N/A* 61% 73% 62% 45% 83% N/A** 
Some primary 
schooling 
68% 52% 69% 79% 83% 65% 65% 46% 
Primary school 
completed 
66% 60% 62% 81% 80% 64% 71% 51% 
Some 
secondary/high 
school 
68% 57% 55% 77% 79% 54% 65% 39% 
Secondary/high 
school completed 
62% 49% 50% 68% 81% 58% 66% 34% 
Post-secondary 
qualifications 
66% 43% 59% 62% 81% 54% 62% 32% 
Some university 57% 58% 45% 72% 75% 50% 63% 27% 
University 
completed 
48% 57% 36% 52% 75% 45% 57% 16% 
Post-graduate 56% 35% 42% 79% 79% 38% 42% 39% 
*Not Available **N=0 (All respondents replied “Disapprove, Strongly Disapprove, or Don’t Know. Cells are 
shaded to easily identify increases and decreases in approval from one year surveyed to another. Lighter shades 
indicate a decrease, and darker shades indicate an increase from the previous year surveyed. 
What we find that is interesting is that the mean level of approval amongst respondents who 
have either a undergraduate or postgraduate degree is lower than any other group, with each 
group having an average of 48% and 51% respectively across all years surveyed. We also 
find that respondents with no schooling had the highest mean score than any other group, at 
70%.  
The next demographic variable I would like to consider is Language- something which some 
have described to be just as important as ethnicity. Perhaps because in South Africa the two 
are very closely tied together. I have brought out four languages and have clustered other 
official South African languages together. I have singled out Xhosa because it is the most 
commonly spoken language in South Africa, and because two of our three presidents spoke 
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Xhosa as a first language- coming from traditionally Xhosa households. I have coded Zulu 
separately because it is the second most commonly spoken indigenous language, and because 
it is the first language of President Jacob Zuma. With Xhosa and Zulu, I would expect to see 
higher levels of approval during the respective presidencies of the Xhosa and Zulu-speaking 
presidents. I have singled out English because it is seen as the most used language in cross-
cultural exchange, after Xhosa and Zulu. I have singled out Afrikaans because it seems to 
have strong cultural ties to the Afrikaner people, as well as because of its strong 
psychological ties to Apartheid- as part of Bantu Education, Afrikaans was forced upon non-
white South Africans, and thus, was seen as a symbol of oppression. I would expect first 
language Afrikaans speakers to be the most vocal opponents of the presidents because of the 
higher probability that they have stronger emotional ties to the previous regime. English 
speakers were often depicted as more “liberal” than Afrikaans speakers, so I would expect 
English speaking South Africans to be more likely to approve of the President than Afrikaans 
speakers.  
 Figure 3.11: Afrobarometer Percentage Presidential Approval by Language 
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What we find in Figure 3.11 is not straight-cut. Firstly, we find that contrary to what we 
expected, Xhosa speakers do not show the highest level of support for Nelson Mandela. It is 
only in 2004 that we see that Xhosa speakers rate Mbeki higher than people who speak other 
languages. This is followed by a sharp drop in 2011. We also find that Zulu speakers gave 
relatively average scores, up until 2011, when Zulu-speaker Zuma was appointed as 
president. This trend continues in 2015, where Zulu speakers have the highest levels of 
approval for the president. Something else that we expected but did not happen, is that 
Afrikaans speakers are not the most disapproving of the president. It is only in three out of 
eight years that they are the most disapproving, and in the remaining four years, it is English 
speakers who are more disapproving than any other group. However, in all but one year 
(2006) Afrikaans and English speaking South Africans are always the lowest two rankers of 
all groups.  
We should expect similar outcomes in terms of ethnicity. I expect that in years 1997 to 2008 
Xhosa respondents should be more likely to grant higher levels of approval than any other 
group, and in 2011 and 2015, we should expect to see the highest levels of approval amongst 
Zulu respondents. What Figure 3.12 tells us is that from 2000 onwards we find this to be true. 
English, Afrikaans/Afrikaner/Boers, and White/European, seem to have more consistently, 
lower levels of approval than other groups.  
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Figure 3.12: Afrobarometer Percentage Presidential Approval by Ethnicity 
 
In moving closer to my multivariate analysis, the last variable I would like to analyse is 
Gender, which will remain dichotomous here and in the multivariate analysis because Gender 
is dichotomous when measured by Afrobarometer. What I expect to find is that men will be 
more likely to show higher levels of support for the presidents than women. There are two 
reasons why this is the expectation; firstly, men represent the Co-identity group and 
therefore, we should expect that men will have higher levels of approval for the presidents 
because they feel that they are being better represented and sought after as men. Secondly, 
the theories on the Gender Gap would indicate that there may be higher levels of approval 
amongst men than women owing to the masculine nature of South African politics. 
What we find in the South African case, is that generally there is no difference in the way 
men and women support the president. Figure 3.13 indicates that the lines of Presidential 
Approval follow a similar trend, and one line is not too far from the other. 
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Figure 3.13: Approval of the Presidents by Gender 
 
The biggest percentage difference between men and women is when women had 5.42% 
higher levels of approval than men in 2002 during Mbeki’s presidency. The second biggest 
gap is when women were 3.88% more approving than men during Mandela’s presidency. It is 
clear that men and women have very similar levels of approval of the president, regardless of 
who the president is. It is also evident that, in the small differences, we can see that in five 
out of eight surveyed years, women had higher aggregate levels of support for the president 
than men.  
It is evident that contrary to Inglehart and Norris’ findings, there is neither a trend of a 
traditional gender gap, nor a trend of gender dealignment or realignment. There may be 
several possible explanations for this divergence. Inglehart and Norris (2000: 449) 
demonstrate in their paper that according to World Value Surveys, South African women do 
not see themselves as left or right. Perhaps this diversion from what the literature prescribes 
is the primary reason for South Africa being dissimilar. Perhaps another explanation is that 
the events I have highlighted are not the events that concern South African women, and they 
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are less critical than the media on these events. After all, Box-Steffensmeier et al mentioned 
that when it comes to women’s issues, men and women tend to have little difference in their 
stance. Perhaps the explanation is that there are other factors that South African’s think are 
more important than Gender.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Sources of Presidential Approval: Testing Competing Hypotheses 
In the previous chapter, I was able to lay the foundation and draw preliminary conclusions 
about the way South Africans shape their evaluations of the presidents. In this chapter I will 
conduct a multivariate analysis of my three hypotheses laid out in Chapter Two in an attempt 
to understand the nature of South Africans’ approval of the president and how these factors 
perform relative to one another. I will be conducting three Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regressions. An OLS regression assumes that a linear relationship exists between my 
dependent and independent variables, and is considered appropriate because all my 
independent variables are on a continuous scale or dichotomous. Therefore, when interpreting 
the results I am able to determine the strength and direction of my independent variables, 
which will make contextual analysis easier. In my analysis I will make use of unstandardized 
Beta coefficients (B) as well as standardised regression coefficient (β). The B will help me 
understand the unique contribution of my independent variables in any given model and year, 
and is helpful when comparing my variables over years. The β, on the other hand, helps me 
understand the relative strength or contribution of my independent variables within one year.  
Model 1: The Identity Hypothesis 
As I have briefly discussed towards the end of Chapter Three, Gender- a predictor variable 
we anticipated would be significant in determining levels of approval, did not produce the 
expected outcome. South African men and women differed very little in their approval of any 
of the presidents. However, Gender is but one of five Co-identity factors I intend to test. In 
Table 2.1 I have already highlighted the Co-identity category in each year surveyed by 
Afrobarometer. As previously stated, the purpose of this hypothesis is to understand if South 
Africans who share specific identity traits with the president are more likely to approve of 
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him. We assume that a reason may be that they feel that the president may be able to 
represent them better as a co-identifier. The regression equation for this model is as follows: 
Approval= (b0+b1Race1+b2Ethnicity2+b3Partisanship3+b4Region4+b5Gender5) + Ԑ1 
Does the data indicate that someone who shares the same race, ethnicity, party affiliation, 
regional heritage and gender as the president in any given year is more likely to approve of 
him?  
Table 4.1 shows the results of OLS regression in each year containing all the Identity 
variables. The model was statistically significant in every year (p<0.001) as indicated in the 
last row of Table 4.1 and in Appendix VIII, which contains the model statistics for every 
year. The model preformed best in 2015, where it accounted for 18.4% of the variance 
(R2=.184, F=105.5, p<0.001). Given these statistics, I am able to reject the null hypothesis 
and conclude that there is indeed a relationship between Co-identity and Presidential 
Approval.  
As expected based upon the descriptive analysis, Gender is not statistically significant in any 
year. The Co-race and Co-partisan variables are consistently statistically significant 
predictors of Presidential Approval in every year surveyed. The Co-race variable had a 
positive Beta coefficient in every year, indicating that black respondents were more likely to 
approve of the president than other South Africans. Co-race has the strongest relationship in 
1997 (B=.871) and 2000 (B=.372) and the weakest in 2006 (B=.128) and 2015 (B=.168). In 
1997, when analysing the standardised regression coefficients, co-race is the strongest 
predictor of Presidential Approval. This corroborates voting behaviour research at that time 
which suggested that race was the best predictor of political behaviour. However, it is only in 
1997 that Co-race is the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval.
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Table 4.1: OLS Regression Analysis of Identity predicting Presidential Approval 
  1997 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2011 2015 
  B β B β B β B β B β B β B β B β 
(CONSTANT) 
 
2.230 
(.032) 
  2.117 
(.040) 
  2.231 
(.037) 
  2.509 
(.040) 
  2.649 
(.040) 
  2.268 
(.042) 
  2.317 
(.037) 
  1.646 
(.043) 
  
CO-RACE (BLACK=1) 
 
.817*** 
(.035) 
.379 .372*** 
(.045) 
.189 .226*** 
(.043) 
.121 .284*** 
(.045) 
.134 .128** 
(.045) 
.064 .225*** 
(.049) 
.103 .289*** 
(.043) 
.149 .168*** 
(.048) 
.075 
CO-ETHNICITY 
(XHOSA/ZULU=1) 
 
-.059 
(.071) 
-.015 -.133 
(.075) 
-.057 -.038 
(.064) 
-.016 .234*** 
(.064) 
.090 .161* 
(.065) 
.072 .383*** 
(.076) 
.147 .170** 
(.056) 
.084 .412*** 
(.060) 
.177 
CO-REGION (EASTERN 
CAPE/ 
KWAZULU NATAL=1) 
 
-.228*** 
(.051) 
-.080 -.096 
(.076) 
-.039 -.019 
(.066) 
-.007 .161* 
(.068) 
.057 -.023 
(.064) 
-.010 .202* 
(.079) 
.073 .387*** 
(.055) 
.190 .238*** 
(.061) 
.096 
CO-PARTISAN (ANC=1) 
 
.252*** 
(.059) 
.069 .489*** 
(.042) 
.261 .378*** 
(.039) 
.215 .472*** 
(.040) 
.251 .460*** 
(.037) 
.267 .100* 
(.041) 
.053 .187*** 
(.035) 
.112 .525*** 
(.039) 
.268 
CO-GENDER (MALE=1) 
 
.051 
(.031) 
.026 .014 
(.037) 
.008 .065 
(.035) 
.037 -.028 
(.036) 
-.015 .026 
(.034) 
.015 -.006 
(.037) 
-.003 .014 
(.032) 
.009 -.058 
(.036) 
-.030 
R² .156*** .129*** .081*** .146*** .100*** .071*** .125*** .184*** 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL,  P<0.05*, P<0.01**, P<0.001***,  (STANDARD ERROR) 
1997=NELSON MANDELA, 2000-2008=THABO MBEKI, 2011-2015=JACOB ZUMA 
FOR EACH VARIABLE 0=OTHER  
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Similarly, the Co-partisan variable also had positive Beta coefficients in every year, 
indicating that ANC supporters were more likely to approve of the president than other South 
Africans. The Co-partisan variable has the strongest relationship in 2015 (B=.268) and the 
weakest relationship in 2008 (B=.053). In 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2015, the co-partisan 
variable was the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval, as indicated by the standardised 
regression coefficients. This meant that in five of the eight years surveyed, being an ANC 
supporter was the strongest predictor of whether someone approved of the president. This 
makes sense given that we can expect supporters of the ruling party to be more likely to 
support their leader. 
The Co-ethnicity variable is only statistically significant from 2004 onwards, and performs 
best in 2008 (B=.383). In fact, when looking at the standardised regression coefficients in 
2008, the co-ethnicity variable has the strongest relationship with Presidential Approval. This 
may be as a result of the nature of the run up to the 2008 ANC Polokwane conference. Thabo 
Mbeki and Jacob Zuma were running for the position of president of the ANC. The 
campaigning seemed to take on a more personal tone, with ethnicity being a particularly 
strong theme.  
In 1997, Co-region has the only negative Beta coefficient out of any of the years analysed. 
This means that in 1997, other South Africans were more likely to approve of the president 
than South Africans from his home province, the Eastern Cape. In 2011, the Co-region 
variable, in this case Kwazulu Natal- the home province of Jacob Zuma- is the strongest 
predictor of Presidential Approval. In 2004, 2008, 2011 and 2015 all variables, excluding 
Gender, are significant predictors of Presidential Approval. This may be some indication that 
South Africans are moving towards making more Co-identity considerations when approving 
of the president.  
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Model 2: Testing Performance Evaluations 
The competing hypothesis is the Performance Evaluation hypothesis, which, as I have 
mentioned in Chapter 2, is based upon rational choice theories within political science. In 
South Africa, the socio-economic landscape laid out in Chapter One tells us that there should 
be variation in needs of different parts of the country. It also tells us that the provision of 
social services is not consistent across the country. Similarly, economic conditions are 
constantly changing. This variation should help add value to the statistical analysis because 
we have respondents of varying needs and expectations. I expect to find that if respondents 
have positive evaluations of how the government delivers Macro-economic Goods, Social 
Services and Economic Safety, and if they have a positive perception of the economy, they 
are more likely to have positive evaluations of the president. For this hypothesis, the 
regression equation for this model is the following: 
Approval=(b0+b1MacroEconomicGoodsEvaluation1+b2SocialServicesEvaluation2+ 
b3EconomicSafety3+b4EconomicPerception4) + Ԑ1 
Table 4.2 indicates the results of the OLS regression of Performance Evaluations predicting 
Presidential Approval. The results indicate that the model performed best in 2015, where it 
accounted for 30% of the variance (R2=.299, F239.01, p<0.001). The model was also 
statistically significant in every year, as indicated in Appendix IX. In most years the model 
accounted for approximately 20% of the variance. 
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Table 4.2: OLS Regression Analysis of Performance Evaluations predicting Presidential Approval 
 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2011 2015 
 B β B β B β B β B β B β B β 
(CONSTANT) .989 
(.061) 
 .996 
(.075) 
 1.597 
(.081) 
 1.243 
(.075) 
 1.022 
(.066) 
 1.287 
(.070) 
 .129 
(.076) 
 
MACRO-ECONOMIC 
GOODS 
.181*** 
(.036) 
.130 .126*** 
(.032) 
.089 .036 
(.031) 
.030 .195*** 
(.028) 
.164 .248*** 
(.031) 
.205 .281*** 
(.029) 
.233 .464*** 
(.036) 
.322 
SOCIAL SERVICES .221*** 
(.028) 
.197 .171*** 
(.024) 
.151 .354*** 
(.028) 
.311 .189*** 
(.026) 
.164 .334*** 
(.026) 
.296 .206*** 
(.025) 
.181 .270*** 
(.029) 
.194 
ECONOMIC SAFETY .041 
(.028) 
.037 .226*** 
(.024) 
.213 .076** 
(.026) 
.076 .133*** 
(.022) 
.136 .023 
(.026) 
.022 .102*** 
(.025) 
.103 .128*** 
(.030) 
.100 
ECONOMIC 
PERCEPTION 
.261*** 
(.019) 
.296 .175*** 
(.019) 
.181 .059* 
(.023) 
.052 .169*** 
(.018) 
.183 .059** 
(.019) 
.059 .043* 
(.017) 
.050 .069** 
(.020) 
.067 
R² .269*** .194*** .160*** .223*** .233*** .202*** .299*** 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL,  P<0.05*, P<0.01**, P<0.001***,  (STANDARD ERROR) 
1997=NELSON MANDELA, 2000-2008=THABO MBEKI, 2011-2015=JACOB ZUMA 
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According to Table 4.2, Social Services and Economic Perception are statistically significant 
in every year surveyed, the Beta coefficients indicate that in every year surveyed, respondents 
who had positive evaluations of government’s handling Social Services, or respondents who 
had positive perceptions of the South African economy, were more likely to have positive 
evaluations of the president. Social Services performs best in 2004 followed by 2008 (B=.354 
and B=.344 respectively). Social Services performs worst in 2002 (B=.171). The 
unstandardized regression coefficients indicate that Social Services was the strongest 
predictor of Presidential Approval in 2004 and 2008, relative to the other variables. 
Economic Perception performed best in 2000 and 2002 (B=.261 and B=.175 respectively). 
The unstandardized regression coefficients indicate that Economic Perception was also the 
strongest predictor of Presidential Approval in 2000 and 2006.  
Macro-Economic Goods is a statistically significant predictor of Presidential Approval in six 
of the seven years analysed. Similarly to Social Services and Economic Perception, the Beta 
coefficients indicate that in every year when the variable was statistically significant, 
respondents who had positive perceptions of how government handled Macro-Economic 
Goods were more likely to have positive evaluations of the president. 2004 is the only year 
when it is not statistically significant. The Beta coefficients indicate that Macro-Economic 
Goods performed best in 2011 and 2015 (B=.281 and B=.464 respectively). Similarly, the 
unstandardized regression coefficients indicated that Macro-Economic Goods was the 
strongest predictor of Presidential Approval in 2011 and 2015. This coincides with the two 
surveyed years when Jacob Zuma was president. During this time, he had announced the 
ANC’s new plan to “reduce poverty, unemployment and inequality” in the form of the New 
Growth Plan in 2010, followed by the National Development Plan in 2013 (South African 
History Online, 2013). Given that approval levels are low in 2015, we can assume that South 
Africans do not believe President Zuma and his government are doing a great job at 
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delivering on the objectives of the NGP and NDP, as Macro-Economic Goods encompasses 
the concepts of reducing unemployment and inequality.  
Economic Safety is statistically significant in five of the seven years surveyed. It is not 
statistically significant in 2000 and 2008. Economic Safety performs best in 2002 (B=.226). 
In this same year, it was the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval. In 2002, 2006, 2011 
and 2015, all four variables were significant predictors of Presidential Approval. This may 
indicate that South Africans make rational decisions based on what they have; considering 
the economy and the way government is performing when they decide whether the president 
is doing a good job. The fact that the model performs best in 2015 may be a further indication 
of the importance of economic variables.  
Model 3: The Cognitive Awareness Hypothesis 
My third model assesses the Cognitive Awareness hypothesis. I expect to find that differing 
levels of education, media usage and political discussion will present differing levels of 
approval. I also expect that if the respondent engages more, that they ought to be more critical 
of the president. The regression equation for this model is as follows: 
Approval= (b0+b1TV1+b2Radio2+b3Newspaper3+b4Education4+b5PoliticalDiscussion5) + Ԑ1 
Table 4.3 and Appendix X indicate that the model was statistically significant in all years. It 
is evident that the model performs best in 2004, when the model accounts for 4% of the 
variance (R²=.038, F=17.62, p<0.001). As the model is significant in every year, I am able to 
reject the null hypothesis and conclude that Cognitive Awareness has some effect on 
Presidential Approval.  
Table 4.3 shows that not one variable is consistently statistically significant in every year 
surveyed. The most successful variables are Education and Discuss Politics, which are 
statistically significant in six of the eight years surveyed. I find that every Beta coefficient for 
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Education is negative, indicating that the less educated a respondent was, the more likely they 
were to approve of the president. Education performed best in 2015 (B=.074, p<0.001), and 
the standardised regression coefficient indicates that relative to the other variables in that 
year, Education is the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval. Education is also the 
strongest predictor of Presidential Approval in 1997.  
Discuss Politics is statistically significant in 1997, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2015. 
In every year, the Beta coefficient indicates that the more frequently people discuss politics, 
the more likely they are to approve of the president.  The variable performs best in 2006 
(B=.147, p<0.001). It is the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval relative to other 
variables in 2006. Discuss Politics is also the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval in 
2000. Newspaper usage is statistically significant in five of the eight years surveyed, between 
2002 and 2011, and the Beta coefficients indicate that in every year respondents who read 
newspaper more frequently were more likely to disapprove of the president. Newspaper 
usage performs best in 2004 (B=.-.090, p<0.001). It is also the only significant predictor of 
Presidential Approval in 2008 (B=-.069, p<0.001). In four of the five years that Newspaper 
Usage significantly predicted Presidential Approval, the standardised regression coefficient 
indicates that Newspaper Usage is the strongest predictor relative to other variables. (2002, 
2004, 2008, 2011). This means that Thabo Mbeki was more unpopular amongst those who 
read the Newspaper more frequently for the majority of his presidency.  
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Table 4.3: OLS Regression Analysis of Cognitive Awareness predicting Presidential Approval 
 
1997 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2011 2015 
 
B β B β B β B β B β B β B β B β 
(CONSTANT) 
2.980 
(.064) 
 
2.602 
(.090) 
 
2.725 
(.077) 
 
3.087 
(.067) 
 
2.771 
(.075) 
 
2.629 
(.084) 
 
2.778 
(.065) 
 
2.238 
(.090) 
 
TV USAGE 
-.003 
(.013) 
-.005 
.018 
(.016) 
.030 
.012 
(.016) 
.019 
.001 
(.015) 
.001 .060*** 
(.015) 
.101 
.025 
(.018) 
.033 
.001 
(.014) 
.001 
.033 
(.020) 
.036 
RADIO USAGE 
.014 
(.014) 
.018 
-.008 
(.016) 
-.009 
.020 
(.019) 
.024 .057** 
(.017) 
.076 
.025 
(.019) 
.030 
.017 
(.019) 
.020 
.025 
(.013) 
.042 
.016 
(.016) 
.023 
NEWSPAPER 
USAGE 
-.020 
(.014) 
-.031 
-.023 
(.017) 
-.039 -.060*** 
(.014) 
-.109 -.090*** 
(.015) 
-.149 -.054*** 
(.013) 
-.100 -.069*** 
(.015) 
-.111 -.027* 
(.012) 
-.051 
-.017 
(.015) 
-.026 
EDUCATION 
-.059*** 
(.012) 
-.099 -.034* 
(.013) 
-.066 -.043*** 
(.012) 
-.087 -.046** 
(.013) 
-.083 
-.009 
(.012) 
-.019 
-.014 
(.013) 
-.024 -.024* 
(.012) 
-.045 -.074*** 
(.013) 
-.129 
DISCUSS 
POLITICS 
.117*** 
(.026) 
.082 .118*** 
(.032) 
.086 .062* 
(.027) 
.050 .075** 
(.028) 
.058 .147*** 
(.026) 
.122 
.023 
(.028) 
.017 
.047 
(.026) 
.039 .100** 
(.030) 
.070 
R 2 .016*** 
 
.011** 
 
.024*** 
 
.038*** 
 
.027*** 
 
.012*** 
 
.007** 
 
.021*** 
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It is clear from the analysis that the Cognitive Awareness hypothesis is not as strongly proved 
as other hypotheses, as the model performs weakly relative to the other two models. There 
does not seem to be any progression towards all Cognitive Awareness variables predicting 
approval, in fact, the model never performs as well as in 2004. It may be that there are other 
outside factors which contribute towards these findings. One contributing factor may be the 
way people access various media sources. Lower literacy levels may contribute towards 
people not reading newspapers as frequently. This may be why we see that Newspaper usage 
and Education both always have negative beta-coefficients, whilst information gathering that 
may be used by illiterate respondents (Television, Radio and Discussing with others) always 
have positive coefficients. This may in fact mean that perhaps it is literate South Africa that is 
more critical of the president. A second factor may be the nature of each source of 
information gathering. As Garramore and Atkin (1986: 77-78) point out, television (as well 
as radio) tends to have briefer, simpler and more engaging news content, which, as pointed 
out above, may be used by the illiterate/less “sophisticated”. On the other hand, print media 
tends to be more in depth, require focussed attention and some motivation, and allows the 
reader to be in control of the content they are receiving. I would also argue that whereas radio 
and television tends to have brief fact-based excerpts, the reader of the newspaper is often 
exposed to the bias of the newspaper or journalists, which may be more critical than 
television or radio (this depends on the type of radio content because some radio 
channels/programmes are dedicated to political discussion).  
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Block-wise Regression: Model 1, 2 and 3 in competition 
 Judging by the performance of each model separately, it seems as though the Performance 
Evaluation model and variables perform better than the other two models. I would like to test 
if the predicting power of any variables changes once they are competing with variables in 
other models. In particular, I would like to see if any of the Performance Evaluation variables 
lose their predicting power once taking the Identity and Cognitive Awareness variables into 
account, or if they perform equally strong. In order to test for changes in predicting power of 
my three models and their variables, I will conduct a Block-wise regression, entering each 
model as a separate block. Step one will be Model 2 because this seems to be the Model 
performing best on its own. I will be reporting standardised regression coefficients because 
variables in different models are measured differently, and by standardising my results, I am 
better able to interpret how they are performing relative to one another.  
According to Table 4.4, I find that all block-wise models are statistically significant. In 2000, 
2002, 2006 and 2008, the addition of Model 1 to Model 2 accounts for an additional 2-3% 
more variance (ΔR²=.027 in 2000, .029 in 2002, .034 in 2006, and .024 in 2008). However, in 
2004 we find that the addition of Model 1 accounts for 7% more variance (ΔR²=.070). In 
2011 and 2015 there is an additional 8% more variance accounted for with the addition of 
Model 1 (ΔR²=.076 in 2011 and .080 in 2015). This means that Model 1 may be adding more 
value in 2004, 2011 and 2015 than in other years surveyed. As indicated earlier, Model 2 
performs best in 2015. With the addition of Model 1 and Model 3, I find that the overall 
model accounts for 40% of the variance- almost half of the sample. On the other hand, the 
addition of Model 3 does not seem to be as impactful as the addition of Model 1 in every 
year. At most, the addition of Model 3 accounts for 1% more variance in 2002 and 2004 
(ΔR²=.011 and .010 respectively). 
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Table 4.4: Block-wise Regression of Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 
 
Dependent Variable: Presidential Approval, p<0.05*, p<0.01**, p<0.001***, Reporting standardised regression coefficients
72 
 
In analysing the effects of individual predictors, it is evident that the Performance Evaluation 
variables perform better compared to other variables. In 2002, 2006, 2011 and 2015, all 
Performance Evaluation variables are statistically significant even when adding Model 1 or 
adding Model 3. In 2000, 2004 and 2008, when adding Model 1 and Model 3, all 
Performance Evaluation variables except Economic Safety are statistically significant. Of all 
the variables across all models, Social Services is the only variable to be consistently 
significant whether analysed within Model 1 only, or when the other two models are added. 
This means that regardless of what South Africans are considering, even when accounting for 
all other factors, they always consider whether government is performing well on social 
services when they evaluate the president. More importantly, if they think the government is 
doing well on delivering social services they are more likely to approve of the president.  
I also find that Macro-Economic Goods and Economic Perception consistently significantly 
predicts Presidential Approval, even when accounting for other factors in other models. With 
each variable there is one instance where it is not statistically significant- Macro-Economic 
Goods when only analysing Model 2, and Economic Perception when competing with 
variables in Model 1, but becomes significant when adding Model 3. Regardless, I am able to 
conclude that respondents’ perception of whether government is delivering on Macro-
Economic Goods and their perception of how the South African economy is doing are 
important factors when considering how well the president is doing. More specifically, if they 
have positive considerations of these factors, they will be more likely to approve of the 
president.  
The Block-wise regression results indicate that Co-Gender is still consistently non-significant 
in every regression. This just further reiterates that even when controlling for other factors, 
Gender does not determine whether a South African would be more likely to approve or 
disapprove. On the other hand I find that, with the exception of 2008, Co-partisan 
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significantly predicts Presidential Approval in every year, meaning that ANC supporters are 
more likely to approve of the president when considering other factors. This could be 
expected given the literature on British parties and Prime Ministerial approval, where we 
were told that the two are closely linked. In the South African context, it demonstrates the 
deep-rooted loyalty that ANC supporters have for their leader relative to non-ANC 
supporters.  
The results in 2008 may be an interpretation of events in that year. It is the only year where 
the Co-partisan variable is non-significant. This may be a result of the ANC leadership battle 
that occurred at that time between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, which may have resulted in 
ANC supporters rather preferring to support Zuma, than the president in question, Mbeki. 
The results also indicate that Co-ethnicity became the only Co-Identity statistically 
significant predictor of Presidential Approval. Given that the run-up to the Polokwane 
conference was heavy-laden with ethnic comparisons of the two presidents, it makes sense 
that Xhosa respondents were more likely to support their Co-Ethnic president. It is also 
evident that the ethnic nature of the Polokwane conference may have had long term effects, 
as Co-ethnicity becomes a more consistently significant predictor of Presidential Approval 
from 2008 onwards. In fact, in 2015, Co-ethnicity is the second strongest predictor of 
Presidential Approval after Macro-Economic Goods. Additionally, 2011 is the only year 
where four Identity variables (excluding Co-gender) are statistically significant predictors of 
Presidential Approval.  
 However, even when controlling for other variables, the Performance Evaluation variables 
still perform better. The standardised regression coefficients indicate that Macro-Economic 
Goods and Social Services were the strongest predictors of Presidential Approval compared 
to other variable that year. Given that this was the year that South Africa started to feel the 
effects of the Great Recession and suffered from xenophobic attacks sparked by 
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unemployment, it makes sense that they would resort to a form of “pocket-book” ascription 
of support. 
Unlike when the Model 1 was analysed in isolation from other models, in the Block-wise 
regression Co-race is not considered a consistently significant predictor when considering 
performance evaluation or cognitive awareness factors. The only time Co-race is the 
strongest predictor is in 1997, which is surprising considering Nelson Mandela was 
considered the champion of the “Rainbow Nation” and non-racialism. However, it is 
important to note that this is the only year where Model 2 could not be entered into the 
Block-wise regression because of the lack of data availability. This could mean that race 
disappears once we control for economic and performance factors.  
As already noted in the analysis of the Model statistics, it seems at Model 3 does not add 
much more value when considering other factors. The most consistent variable is Newspaper 
Usage, which significantly predicted Presidential Approval for the majority of Thabo 
Mbeki’s two terms. Unfortunately for Mbeki, it seems that respondents who used newspapers 
more frequently were more likely to disapprove of him, similarly to when Model 3 is 
analysed alone. The Model 3 results may indicate that, rather than using sophisticated or low-
information reasoning when deciding if they approve of the president, South Africans are 
more likely to draw from other experiences which may be considered more personal or 
personal to those around them. They are more likely to look at whether the president is 
similar to them, and even more so, they are willing to consider what they have and how the 
country is performing when they decide if the approve of the president 
75 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
The results of my analysis using IDASA and Afrobarometer data indicates that South 
Africans do shape their evaluations based on Performance Evaluation, Co-Identity and, to an 
extent, between 1997 and 2015. I have shown that there is variation in the levels of approval 
for each president and this variation seems to be driven by these factors over time. Although 
the nature of approval changes over time, there seems to be some consistency with the 
existing theory.  
It is clear from the descriptive analysis that some Identity variables such as Co-race and Co-
partisanship may influence the way people approve of the president when analysed relative to 
other Identity variables. With more in-depth statistical analysis I found that South Africans 
may be more co-ethnic over time, as the predicting strength of Model 1 and its variables are 
better towards 2015. It is obvious that allegiance to the ANC would be a good predictor of 
Presidential Approval, and the statistical significance of Race in every year compliments the 
literature on voting behaviour which seems to allude to some form of a racial census. Even 
though there is not a perfect relationship between Black respondents and high levels of 
approval, it is still true that if the respondent is black, there is a higher likelihood that they 
will approve of the president. However, it is important to note that when controlling for 
performance evaluation factors, Race becomes less important than when alone. Whilst my 
findings of Race and Approval were somewhat expected, my findings on Gender were not. 
Given the emphasis placed on Gender issues and politics in literature and media, my 
expectation was that Gender would be statistically significant, even if only during Jacob 
Zuma’s presidency. However, my analysis seems to disprove any claims made, especially by 
the media, that woman would be more critical than men of Jacob Zuma.  
76 
 
The Performance Evaluations theory does stand particularly strong, whether on its own or 
relative to other theories. My statistical results consistently indicate that South Africans are 
more likely to approve of the president if they believe that his government is doing a good 
job, or if they believe the economy is doing well. This rational choice-type ascription of 
approval corroborates previous findings in Western literature such as 
Expectation/Disillusionment and other economic theories. In a country that suffers from high 
levels of unemployment and a high Gini-coefficient indicating high levels of economic 
inequality, this may serve as a wake-up call to any current or future serving president who 
aims to be well liked; delivery and performance equals higher approval. In the past two 
surveyed years it seems that Macro-Economic Goods are particularly worth serving, as they 
performed better than any other variable- perhaps an indication that more South Africans are 
taking the bigger picture in to account. To the president and his government this would mean 
delivering on things such as jobs, keeping the economic conditions of the country stable and 
decreasing levels of inequality in South Africa. However, this does not mean that Social 
Services and the broader economy can be forgotten as they too were statistically significant in 
every year, performing better in five of the seven years where these questions were answered. 
Economic Safety, which includes how government handles corruption, is also becoming 
more important, which may indicate that the president may want to seriously consider the 
way they handle crime and corruption.  
It is clear from my analysis that whilst Model 3 is statistically significant, the Cognitive 
Awareness hypothesis does not take a specific form. Instead, other factors may have to be 
taken into account when reading each individual variable. Factors such as the types of people 
who use and have access to various media sources. What this may mean is that whilst 
information-gathering does not influence respondents to make specific types of decisions, it 
may be more likely that certain people who are predisposed to have certain levels of 
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approval, use specific forms of information gathering. Rather the type of information 
gathered by respondents is perhaps more personal; what do I have, or what do I need from my 
government? What can I afford? How does they president represent me as a person?  
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Suggestions for further research 
My study of presidential approval was a first attempt to quantitatively understand how South 
Africans shape their evaluations of the president, and it was a first attempt to expand 
presidential studies to the African continent using established political theory. However, this 
being a first attempt and a Master’s dissertation (which is limiting in terms of length and 
scope), I believe that there are gaps which may still be filled by future research and that there 
is room for development on president approval studies in South Africa and Africa.  
I would recommend that in order to provide a better picture of presidential approval in South 
Africa, more questions be added to the Afrobarometer questionnaire which explores the 
relationship people have to levels of approve. This would include questions on how people 
feel the president is performing specific tasks, or even what these tasks ought to be. I would 
also recommend a study using hard economic indicators and government delivery statistics in 
an advanced statistical analysis.  
Another recommendation is that this study be taken to the cross-national level. This is 
feasible using Afrobarometer data which has been collected in multiple African countries, 
and consistently in some. A cross-national analysis may help us understand the nature of 
presidential versus prime ministerial systems in Africa, and whether they do impact 
popularity studies. It will also help us explore the Identity and Performance Evaluation 
hypothesis in more detail as we add more variation in the form of varying economic 
conditions and varying levels of co-ethnicity.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: Government Handling variables included in Performance Evaluation indices 
 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 2.5 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 
 
Q63a. How well is govt 
creating jobs 
Q45b. Handling 
creating jobs 
Q65b. Handling 
creating jobs 
Q65b. Handling 
creating jobs 
Q57c. Handling 
creating jobs 
Q65c. Handling 
creating jobs 
Q66c. Handling 
creating jobs 
 
Q63c. How well is govt 
ensuring that prices 
remain stable 
Q45c. Handling 
keeping prices stable 
Q65c. Handling 
keeping prices stable 
Q65c. Handling 
keeping prices 
stable 
Q57d. Handling 
keeping prices down 
Q65d. Handling 
keeping prices down 
Q66d. Handling 
keeping prices down 
 
Q63d. How well does 
govt reduce crime 
Q45e. Handling 
reducing crime 
Q65e. Handling 
reducing crime 
Q65e. Handling 
reducing crime 
Q57f. Handling 
reducing crime 
Q65f. Handling 
reducing crime 
Q66f. Handling 
reducing crime 
 
Q63e. How well is govt 
improving health 
services 
Q45f. Handling 
improving basic 
health services 
Q65f. Handling 
improving basic 
health services 
Q65f. Handling 
improving basic 
health services 
Q57g. Handling 
improving basic 
health services 
Q65g. Handling 
improving basic 
health services 
Q66g. Handling 
improving basic 
health services 
 
Q63f. How well does 
govt address the 
educational needs of all 
South Africans 
Q45g. Handling 
addressing 
educational needs 
Q65g. Handling 
addressing 
educational needs 
Q65g. Handling 
addressing 
educational needs 
Q57h. Handling 
addressing 
educational needs 
Q65h. Handling 
addressing 
educational needs 
Q66h. Handling 
addressing 
educational needs 
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Q63g. How well does 
govt manage the 
economy 
Q45a. Handling 
managing the 
economy 
Q65a. Handling 
managing the 
economy 
Q65a. Handling 
managing the 
economy 
Q57a. Handling 
managing the 
economy 
Q65a. Handling 
managing the 
economy 
Q66a. Handling 
managing the 
economy 
 
Q63h. How well does 
govt deliver basic 
services like water and 
electricity 
Q45h. Handling 
delivering household 
water 
Q65h. Handling 
delivering household 
water 
Q65h. Handling 
delivering 
household water 
Q57i. Handling 
providing water and 
sanitation services 
Q65i. Handling 
providing water and 
sanitation services 
Q66i. Handling 
providing water and 
sanitation services 
Q63k. Fighting 
corruption in govt 
 
Q45j. Handling 
fighting corruption in 
government 
Q65j. Handling 
fighting corruption 
Q65j. Handling 
fighting corruption 
Q57k. Handling 
fighting corruption 
Q65k. Handling 
fighting corruption 
Q66k. Handling 
fighting corruption 
Q62m. Narrowing 
income gap 
 
Q45d. Handling 
narrowing gaps 
between rich and 
poor 
Q65d. Handling 
narrowing income 
gaps 
Q65d. Handling 
narrowing income 
gaps 
Q57e. Handling 
narrowing income 
gaps 
Q65e. Handling 
narrowing income 
gaps 
Q66e. Handling 
narrowing income 
gaps 
Q63n. How well is govt 
distributing welfare 
payments to those who 
are entitled to it 
Q45OSAF 
Distributing welfare 
payments to those 
entitled to it 
Q65n-SAF. Handling 
distributing welfare 
payments 
Q65n_SAF. 
Handling 
distributing welfare 
payments 
Q57r-saf. Handling 
distributing welfare 
payments 
 
Q65R-SAF. Handling 
distributing welfare 
payments to those 
who are entitled to 
them 
Q66o_SAF. Handling 
distributing welfare 
payments to those 
who are entitled to 
them 
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Appendix II: Inter-item correlation of Performance Evaluation indices 
 
 
Q66A. 
Handling 
managing 
the economy 
Q66C. 
Handling 
creating jobs 
Q66D. 
Handling 
keeping 
prices down 
Q66E. 
Handling 
narrowing 
income gaps 
Q66G. 
Handling 
improving 
basic health 
services 
Q66H. 
Handling 
addressing 
educational 
needs 
Q66I. 
Handling 
providing 
water and 
sanitation 
services 
Q66O_SAF. 
Handling 
distributing 
welfare 
payments 
Q66F. 
Handling 
reducing 
crime 
Q66K. 
Handling 
fighting 
corruption 
Q66A. Handling 
managing the economy 
1.000 .479 .467 .375 .404 .406 .325 .282 .405 .391 
Q66C. Handling 
creating jobs 
.479 1.000 .539 .443 .301 .360 .291 .173 .519 .446 
Q66D. Handling 
keeping prices down 
.467 .539 1.000 .523 .329 .302 .224 .205 .425 .423 
Q66E Q66e. Handling 
narrowing income gaps 
.375 .443 .523 1.000 .290 .247 .206 .165 .444 .400 
Q66G. Handling 
improving basic health 
services 
.404 .301 .329 .290 1.000 .662 .417 .359 .302 .246 
Q66H. Handling 
addressing educational 
needs 
.406 .360 .302 .247 .662 1.000 .466 .340 .309 .236 
Q66I. Handling 
providing water and 
sanitation services 
.325 .291 .224 .206 .417 .466 1.000 .309 .239 .225 
Q66O_SAF. Handling 
distributing welfare 
payments 
.282 .173 .205 .165 .359 .340 .309 1.000 .199 .168 
Q66F. Handling 
reducing crime 
.405 .519 .425 .444 .302 .309 .239 .199 1.000 .465 
Q66K. Handling 
fighting corruption 
.391 .446 .423 .400 .246 .236 .225 .168 .465 1.000 
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Appendix III: Table of Communalities for Performance Evaluation indices 
COMMUNALITIES   
Q66A. Handling managing the economy 0.384 
Q66C. Handling creating jobs 0.457 
Q66D. Handling keeping prices down 0.439 
Q66E. Handling narrowing income gaps 0.362 
Q66G. Handling improving basic health services 0.492 
Q66H. Handling addressing educational needs 0.509 
Q66I. Handling providing water and sanitation services 0.276 
Q66O_SAF. Handling distributing welfare payments to those who are entitled to them 0.183 
Q66F. Handling reducing crime 0.387 
Q66K. Handling fighting corruption 0.325 
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Appendix IV: Factor Loadings of factor analysis for Performance Evaluation indices  
 Factor Loading 
1 2 
Q66A. Handling managing the economy .487  
Q66C. Handling creating jobs .718  
Q66D. Handling keeping prices down .720  
Q66E. Handling narrowing income gaps .677  
Q66F. Handling reducing crime .656  
Q66K. Handling fighting corruption .650  
Q66G. Handling improving basic health services  -.802 
Q66H. Handling addressing educational needs  -.867 
Q66I. Handling providing water and sanitation services 
 -.530 
Q66O_SAF. Handling distributing welfare payments to those who are entitled to them  -.425 
Eigenvalues 4.20 1.41 
% of Variance 41.95 14.09 
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Appendix V: South African Generational Cohorts 
GENERATION 1997 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2011 2015 
PRE-APARTHEID 66 and older 69 and older 71 and older 73 and older 75 and older 77 and older 80 and older 84 and older 
EARLY APARTHEID 65-53 68-56 70-58 72-60 74-62 76-64 79-67 83-71 
GRAND APARTHEID 52-38 55-41 57-43 59-45 61-47 63-49 66-52 70-56 
STRUGGLE 37-17 40-20 42-22 44-24 46-26 48-28 51-31 55-35 
BORN FREES 
16 and 
younger 
19 and 
younger 
21 and 
younger 
23 and 
younger 
25 and 
younger 
27 and 
younger 
30 and 
younger 
34 and 
younger 
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Appendix VI: Percentage South African Generational Cohorts in Sample 
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Appendix VII: Percentage Presidential Approval by Generational Cohort 
 
1997 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2011 2015 
Born Free Generation 
 
63% 57% 78% 81% 55% 69% 36% 
Struggle Generation 69% 55% 55% 75% 80% 56% 65% 36% 
Grand Apartheid Generation 66% 52% 58% 72% 78% 62% 59% 37% 
Early Apartheid Generation 60% 48% 57% 71% 85% 55% 67% 54% 
Pre-Apartheid Generation 58% 54% 58% 66% 74% 52% 69% 38% 
Range 11% 15% 4% 12% 11% 10% 11% 18% 
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Appendix VIII: OLS Model 1 Statistics: Identity predicting Presidential Approval 
YEAR R² F SIGN. 
1997 .156 121.62 p<0.001 
2000 .129 58.7 p<0.001 
2002 .081 39.3 p<0.001 
2004 .146 78.28 p<0.001 
2006 .100 51.31 p<0.001 
2008 .071 35.36 p<0.001 
2011 .125 66.26 p<0.001 
2015 .184 105.5 p<0.001 
 
Appendix IX: OLS Model 2 Statistics: Performance Evaluation predicting Presidential 
Approval 
YEAR R² F SIGN. 
2000 .269 182.97 p<0.001 
2002 .194 133.98 p<0.001 
2004 .160 108.44 p<0.001 
2006 .223 164.75 p<0.001 
2008 .233 175.59 p<0.001 
2011 .202 146.92 p<0.001 
2015 .299 239.01 p<0.001 
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Appendix X: OLS Model 3 Statistics: Cognitive Awareness predicting Presidential 
Approval 
YEAR R² F SIGN. 
1997 .016 10.17 p<0.001 
2000 .011 4.26 p<0.01 
2002 .024 10.63 p<0.001 
2004 .038 17.62 p<0.001 
2006 .027 12.71 p<0.001 
2008 .012 5.35 p<0.001 
2011 .007 3.35 p<0.01 
2015 .021 9.94 p<0.001 
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